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Efforts have been underway for several years in the private sector
and in the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to conceptualize how a Nationwide Health Information Net-
work (NHIN) would work.1 Until recently, Congress had not author-
ized large-scale implementation of any concrete pieces of such
infrastructure. That changed with passage of the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) in September 2007.2
FDAAA's section 9053 authorizes the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to oversee development of a nationwide data network, the Sen-
tinel System, 4 aimed at including data for 25 million patients by July
2010 and 100 million by July 2012. 5 Speculative concerns about
health database privacy suddenly are enlivened with a riveting imme-
diacy. This is here, now. One in three Americans is slated to be
inducted into this data network within four years.
6
Section 905 responds to shortcomings in FDA's traditional
approach to drug safety, which relied heavily on preapproval clinical
trials. Clinical trials, which typically test a drug on several hundred to
1 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nationwide Health Information Net-
work (NHIN): Background, http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/healthnetwork/
background/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
2 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
3 § 905, 121 Stat. at 944-49 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (k) (3)-(4) (West
Supp. 2008)).
4 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., FDA's Senti-
nel Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/sentinel/ (last visited Oct.
10, 2008); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE 1 (2008), http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/
reports/report05O8.pdf (discussing the goals and structure of the Sentinel Initiative).
5 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (B) (ii).
6 For persons with health coverage, odds of being in the system are even greater
than one in one in three, since the system's initial 100 million inputs are expected to
be drawn from Medicare and insurance claims data. See discussion infra Part I.
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a few thousand people 7 for fewer than twenty-four months, may fail to
detect rare risks, risks that emerge only in long-term use, and risks of
off-label uses not tested in the original clinical trials.8 The 2004 scan-
dal involving rofecoxib, which was widely marketed under the brand
name Vioxx, was one in a series of instances where serious risks
escaped detection in clinical trials.9 Designed in the mid-twentieth
century, FDA's drug safety regulatory framework was failing to harness
modern information technology to glean additional drug safety infor-
mation in the postmarket period after drugs are in wide clinical use.10
In 2005, the HHS Secretary directed FDA to explore the potential for
using information technology to improve drug safety monitoring. 1
In 2006, FDA decided to harness the power of bioinformatics as one
of its top six priorities under the agency's Critical Path Initiative.
12
7 See Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, The Institu-
tional Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2001) (finding
that an average of 4,237 human subjects are needed before a single new drug reaches
the marketplace).
8 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4, at 5; see also BarbaraJ. Evans, What
Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FooD & DRUG L.J. 753,
783-85 (2006) (describing the risks and benefits of off-label uses); Margaret Z. Johns,
Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest,
58 HASTINGS LJ. 967, 969 (2007) (discussing the health risks of off-label prescription
use); David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006) (reporting statistics on the prevalence of off-
label use); AlastairJJ. Wood et al., Making Medicines Safer-The Need for an Independent
Drug Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1851, 1851 (1998) (discussing several drugs
that exhibited rare or late-emerging risks after FDA approval).
9 See Barbara J. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug
Safety Regulation, 61 FooD & DRUG LJ. 45, 45-48 (2006) (summarizing late-emerging
drug safety risks).
10 See id. at 47-54 (discussing problems with FDA's postmarket monitoring and
reporting systems that emphasize collection of data which would have been relevant
during premarket approval, but which are not necessarily relevant to safe clinical
use); see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Senti-
nel Network Public Meeting 4 (Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter FDA, March 7 Proceed-
ings] (statement of Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dockets/07n0016/07n-0016-trOO00.pdf (discussing how developments in
technology now afford FDA the opportunity to collect necessary information during
the postmarket period).
11 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4, at 11 (explaining that the HHS
Secretary directed FDA to expand its current system for monitoring medical product
performance by capitalizing on the emerging sciences of information technology and
drug safety).
12 See generally U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
FDA's Critical Path Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008) (providing information about the goals and activities of the
Critical Path Initiative).
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That same year, reports by the Institute of Medicine' 3 and Govern-
ment Accountability Office 14 called on Congress to grant FDA addi-
tional authority and resources to modernize its drug safety
information systems. Section 905 implements recommendations in
those reports.15
Sentinel System data will include patients' Medicare, military, and
private insurance claims data, health records, pharmaceutical
purchase data, and "other data as the Secretary [of HHS] deems nec-
essary."' 6 In theory, this last clause would let FDA requisition people's
entire medical records or their stored tissue or tumor specimens1 7 for
testing to see whether patients were genetically predisposed to drug-
related injuries that they suffered, although FDA has not indicated it
intends to take such steps. The 25-million-person milestone initially
will be met with Medicare claims data,' 8 and a new regulation already
has been issued to enable FDA's access to Medicare data. 19 The
agency already has signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Veterans' Health Administration for sharing of information. 20 The
100-million-person milestone can be met by obtaining claims data
from about ten large private health insurers.21 Including data for 200
million people, while not one of section 905's stated milestones, is
regarded as technically feasible 22 and desirable. 23
13 COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 167-73 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006).
14 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 1, 4-6 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
15 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Sentinel
Initiative: Fact Sheet, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/sentinel/factsheet.
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
16 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(III)(aa)-(cc) (West Supp.
2008).
17 By "stored" specimens, I refer to previously collected specimens left over from
prior surgical and diagnostic procedures to which the patient consented during the
course of medical care. Compulsory collection of new specimens would not be lawful
under the clause in question.
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., New Efforts to Help
Improve Medical Products for Patient Safety and Quality of Medical Care (May 22,
2008), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/05/20080522a.html.
19 Medicare Program; Medicare Part D Claims Data, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,664, 30,664
(May 28, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 423).
20 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4, at 18.
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Congress intends for these data to be used in postmarket surveil-
lance and advanced analysis of drug safety. Studying insurance claims
can reveal, for example, that an individual began purchasing Cox-2
painkillers-the class of drugs that includes Vioxx-in 2003 and suf-
fered a heart attack in 2004. On average, only two in ten such coinci-
dences turn out, after further study, to be a drug safety issue. 24 Thus
there will need to be occasional access to patients' whole medical
records to pin down causes of specific suggestive coincidences,
although there are no current plans for routine canvassing of people's
entire medical histories.25 As yet, FDA has not indicated any plans to
obtain data from previously stored specimens, although the value of
genetic studies of specimens in drug safety research is recognized.
26
Congress authorized FDA to engage private-sector companies to
help develop and operate the system infrastructure. 27 The agency
also is authorized to allow access to Sentinel System data for specified
uses, including certain types of studies and research,2 by academic,
private sector, and public entities.29 Thus, FDA has the power to
approve access to sensitive health data by two types of outside entity:
infrastructure operators and outside data users. An unanswered ques-
tion is how patients' privacy will be protected.
If transparency is conducive to public trust, then FDA arguably
missed its first opportunity to cultivate public trust in the Sentinel Sys-
tem. The day section 905 became law, HHS issued a press release that
tersely described FDA's sweeping new data-gathering powers as "activi-
ties related to medical product safety"3 0-a thing to which few Ameri-
cans could object given our status as the world's most assiduous pill-
23 Id. at 72-73 (statement of Dr. Miles Braun) (querying whether a 100-million-
person database might fail to be representative of important subgroups of the Ameri-
can population).
24 Id. at 57 (statement of Dr. Marc Overhage).
25 See id. at 57-59; see also id. at 66-68, 71 (statement of Dr. Richard Platt) (dis-
cussing the need, in occasional instances, to review full medical records to assess
causes of specific adverse incidents).
26 See id. at 114-18 (statements of Drs. Michael Caldwell and Jeffrey Shuren).
27 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (iii) (West Supp. 2008).
28 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (k) (4) (A) (i)-(iii); see also U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 4, at 16 (showing a research component as part of the system's organiza-
tional structure).
29 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A), (D).
30 Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., New Law Ensures Access
to Medical Treatments and Information (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.hhs.
gov/news/press/2007pres/09/pr20070927e.html.
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eaters. 3 1 The announcement did not elaborate that these activities
involve gathering personal health data on 100 million Americans for
sharing, at FDA's discretion, with outside academic and commercial
entities. As read by committed privacy advocates, this press release
was as transparent as stating that FDA intends to bake apple pie, not
mentioning that the congressionally approved recipe calls for blood
of their first-born child. The Sentinel System is intended to serve
important public health objectives. Achieving these objectives entails
doing things that may make many members of the public uncomforta-
ble. Squarely recognizing what Congress has approved and openly air-
ing the issues it presents are essential in cultivating public trust and in
bringing this system-and its hoped-for benefits-to fruition.
Part I describes the Sentinel System and explores why section 905
of FDAAA amounts to an infrastructure regulatory mandate. Part II
notes the inherent conflict between privacy protection and other,
competing objectives Congress set out in section 905. Part III exam-
ines the breadth of FDA's power to share Sentinel System data with
outside parties, assuming FDA were to go to the full limit of what sec-
tion 905 allows. Decisions allowing access to Sentinel System data are
coercive in their effect on persons whose data are included in the net-
work. Part IV notes how little history FDA has had in making deci-
sions with coercive effect on the public; the agency's existing
framework of institutional protections is not suited to its new regula-
tory mission. Part V draws on experience of other infrastructure regu-
lators to explore ways to promote legitimacy and public acceptability
of decisions to release Sentinel System data.
31 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 18, at
2 (noting that Americans not on Medicare average thirteen prescriptions per year,
while those on Medicare average about twenty-eight per year). Those Medicare bene-
ficiaries who consider themselves in poor health consume about forty-five prescrip-
tions per year. Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey (2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCBS/Downloads/A04%2Ric
%201.pdf); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sevs., Medicare Current Benefici-
ary Survey (MCBS), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/LimitedDataSets/llMCBS.asp (last
viewed Nov. 14, 2008) (describing the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey). Other
Americans use about thirteen prescriptions per year, according to a 2007 study by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. See Press Release, Agency for Health-
care Research & Quality, Drug Spending Increases More Than 2.5 Times in 8 Years
(May 16, 2007), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/nn/nn051607.htm.
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I. FDAAA SECTION 905 As AN INFRASTRUCTURE
REGULATORY MANDATE
Section 905 profoundly alters the nature of FDA's regulatory
mandate. While continuing its traditional product regulatory and
consumer protection duties, FDA also will be an infrastructure regula-
tor charged with overseeing construction and operation of the vast
data network just described. This thrusts FDA into the ranks of infra-
structure regulators like the old Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which regulated railroads; the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), which regulates interstate transmission of electricity,
oil, and natural gas; and the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), which regulates telecommunications. This does not mean that
FDA will fulfill all the same tasks, such as regulation of pricing and
industry rates of return, traditionally associated with these other regu-
lators. Nonetheless, section 905 is an infrastructure regulatory
mandate.
Prof. G6mez-Ibifiez defines infrastructure as "networks that dis-
tribute products or services over geographical space." 32 Americans
traditionally have referred to their infrastructure industries as public
utilities (such as electricity networks, natural gas transmission and dis-
tribution networks, and water systems) 3 3 and common carriers (such
as telecommunications networks, railroads, airlines, trucking, and oil
pipelines).3 4 Infrastructure is a broader term that includes those
industries, but others as well. Modern manifestations include the
Internet, high-speed data transmission networks, and distributed com-
puting networks.3 5 Not all infrastructure industries exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics, 36 which traditionally supplied the rationale
for regulating pricing and rates of return.3 7 Not all infrastructure net-
works are public utilities in the sense of having a duty to serve all
would-be users at fair rates.38 FDA's Sentinel System will be a limited-
purpose network serving a restricted set of users: FDA and certain
32 Jost A. G6MEZ-IBA1NEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE 4 (2003).
33 See Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the
Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1617, 1617-18 (2004) (reviewing GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note
32).
34 See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548,
548 (1969).
35 Chen, supra note 33, at 1620.
36 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1334 (1998).
37 CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 171-73 (3d ed.
1993).
38 Posner, supra note 34, at 607.
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outside data users that meet criteria that this Article explores. 39 FDA's
public protection mandate does not involve defending the public
from monopolistic abuses; it involves protecting the privacy of people
whose data are in the network. 40 Thus, price regulation is not central
to the agency's infrastructure regulatory mission. The agency may
encounter pricing issues in its role as a purchaser/user of Sentinel
System data, but not as a regulator of prices in sales to the public.
All major infrastructure development efforts start the same way: a
new type of resource is seen as having value, and an infrastructure
network is needed to develop the resource and supply it to people
who want to use it. In the power industry, the key resource is electric-
ity, and the infrastructure is power generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution facilities. In FDAAA, Congress did not define the key
resource or the necessary infrastructure. Congress simply determined
that certain activities have value; these include certain kinds of
postmarket drug safety surveillance 41 and advanced analysis of drug
safety data. 42 Congress left it for FDA to define the specific data
resources and infrastructure it needs to support those activities.
Based on discussion at public meetings FDA held in 2007, 43 the
following can be inferred: in the Sentinel System, the key resource is
longitudinal population health data (LPHD)-health data aggregated
both longitudinally (so that disparate sources of health data for a
given individual can be linked together chronologically to track ill-
nesses, treatments, and outcomes) 44 and horizontally across a large
population (so these data can be compared with similar data for other
individuals). 4 5 The needed infrastructure includes information sys-
tems to link individual patients' health records longitudinally; to allow
data to be queried and compared across large groups of people; and
to allow access to the data by authorized users, while protecting the
39 See infra Part III.
40 See infra Part I.B.
41 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3) (West Supp. 2008).
42 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4).
43 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Proceedings, Sentinel Network Public Meeting
(Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter FDA, March 8 Proceedings], http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dockets/07n0016/07n-001 6-tr0002.pdf.
44 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10, at 51-56 (statement of Dr. Marc
Overhage); see also FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 43, at 74 (statement of Dr.
Clement McDonald) (discussing the importance and difficulty of linking data
longitudinally).
45 See FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10, at 23 (statement of Dr. Jeffrey
Hill).
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privacy of persons whose raw health data are involved.46 Sentinel Sys-
tem data will not necessarily be transported for central storage on
computers at FDA. 47 As currently envisioned, FDA may adopt a
decentralized architecture that sends queries to locations where data
are stored and returns answers to the user.
48
The need for new infrastructure does not always imply a need for
infrastructure regulation. Unregulated private-sector investors often
can supply and operate needed infrastructure, without any problems
that go beyond what can be managed by general-purpose laws such as
the Sherman Act.49 Thus, the United States installed a vast network of
personal computers without ever having to appoint a federal laptop
regulator, although policing of antitrust issues was, at times,
required. 50 Two common situations where governmental intervention
may be needed are: (1) when barriers-for example, economic or
legal-are blocking private-sector development of the needed infra-
structure, or (2) when unregulated private infrastructure operation
poses problems, such as abuse of vulnerable persons, that are not ade-
quately addressed by general law.51 Possible responses include regula-
tion to address the industry-specific problems 52 or outright public
ownership and operation of infrastructure. 53 The United States has
46 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4, at 13-16 (explaining that the goal
of the Sentinel System is to create a national, integrated, electronic system for moni-
toring medical product safety that still protects the privacy of the persons whose medi-
cal data are used in the system).
47 See FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10, at 12 (statement of Dr. Janet
Woodcock) (explaining that the goal of the Sentinel System is not to create a "grand
database," but rather to build on existing database efforts and promote connectivity).
48 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Sen-
tinel Initiative: Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/
sentinel/qanda.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
49 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1629, 1652, 1707.
50 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rem-
edy appeal); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (con-
tempt proceeding); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002)
(non-settling states' remedy); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144
(D.D.C. 2002) Uustice Department settlement approval); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law), affd in part, rev'd in part
en banc, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (merits appeal); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
51 See PHILLIPS, supra note 37, at 172-73; see also G6MEZ-IBAj;EZ, supra note 32, at
20-21; Chen, supra note 33, at 1624-28 (reviewing G6mez-Ibdfiez's discussion of gov-
ernment regulation of infrastructure operation).
52 Chen, supra note 33, at 1628.
53 See id. at 1629 (citing GOMEZ-IBAT EZ, supra note 32, at 13); Daniela Klingebiel
& Jeff Ruster, Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives 7
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2358, 2000).
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consistently rejected the latter option. It is the only nation that main-
tained private ownership of its major, interstate infrastructure net-
works throughout the twentieth century. 54 It achieved this through
pervasive regulation of private infrastructure networks to address their
industry-specific problems. Other nations, many of which began the
twentieth century with privately owned infrastructure, nationalized it
at mid-century55 and relied on public ownership of infrastructure in
varying degrees. 56 However, as the twentieth century ended, govern-
ments worldwide were turning back to private infrastructure owner-
ship subject to some form of infrastructure regulation. 57
Consistent with U.S. tradition, Congress authorized FDA to
engage private entities on a temporary or permanent basis to develop
and operate the Sentinel System. 58 The apparent rationale for FDA's
regulatory involvement is that private-sector developers, without regu-
latory intervention, would not be able to supply LPHD of the type and
on the scale required: for 25 to 100 million people, with capacity to
"drill down" into whole health records on occasion. Two barriers-
logistical and legal-stand in their way. The logistical problem is the
fragmented way health care is financed and provided in the United
States. The average Medicare patient sees six different doctors per
year, 59 and Americans change jobs frequently, flitting from insurer to
insurer.60 The raw inputs for making LPHD-basic health data gener-
ated during patients' routine interactions with healthcare providers
and insurers-are widely scattered. The United States currently lacks
infrastructure for linking these data longitudinally. The first solid evi-
dence that a drug or device is harmful sometimes comes from other
nations with national healthcare systems, greater coordination and
54 GOMEZ-IBAf4EZ, supra note 32, at 2; see also Chen, supra note 33, at 1632 (citing
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 181-83 (1982)).
55 G6MEZ-IBA&EZ, supra note 32, at 2.
56 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1634.
57 See Klingebiel & Ruster, supra note 53, at 7.
58 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (iii) (West Supp. 2008).
59 Promoting Disease Management in Medicare: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health,
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 22-23 (2002) (statement of Dr. Gerard
Anderson, Director, Robert Wood Nat'l Program P'ship for Solutions: Better Lives for
People with Chronic Conditions).
60 See, e.g., M. Susan Marquis & Kanika Kapur, Employment Transitions and Con-
tinuity of Health Insurance: Implications for Premium Assistance Programs, HEALTH AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 198, 198-99 (noting that employment is not static and that job
turnover due to layoffs or other circumstances results in insurance turnover); see also
FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 43, at 53 (statement of Dr. Clement McDon-
ald) (discussing twenty-percent rate of membership turnover in some HMOs).
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continuity of care, and thus better longitudinal linkage of individual
health records and better aggregation at the population level.61
Linking data longitudinally requires at least some identifying
information to establish which data pertain to the same person. 62
Herein lies the legal barrier: under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 199663 and related regulations
(HIPAA Privacy Rule), 64 it is infeasible for a private, commercial
database operator to obtain all the individual authorizations (or waiv-
ers of authorization) that would be needed to obtain identifiable
information for 25 to 100 million people. 65 Moreover, even if private
61 See FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 43, at 42 (statement of Dr. Robert
M. Califf); id. at 23-24 (statement of Dr. Miles Braun).
62 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
63 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
64 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2007).
65 Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, covered entities such as doctors and insurers
need an authorization signed by the patient before they can disclose health data con-
taining patient-identifying information to the private operator. Absent an authoriza-
tion, they can only supply health data to the private operator in coded form (i.e., with
a code number substituted for any information that would allow the patient to be
identified). 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2) (i) (R), (c). Moreover, the coded disclosure
would be subject to HIPAA's "minimum necessary" standard, which limits the amount
of health data that can be released. See id. § 164.514(d). Alternatively, the doctor and
insurer could release identified health data to the private operator if their respective
HIPAA Privacy Boards or Institutional Review Boards granted a waiver of authoriza-
tion under the Privacy Rule. See id. § 164.512(i). However, it seems highly unlikely
that release of identified data to a private operator, whose business model rests on
commercial sale of data, could qualify under the criteria for granting a waiver, which
include, among other things, that risks to patient privacy be minimal. See id. Even if
the waiver criteria could be met, the process of obtaining waivers would be unwork-
ably cumbersome for a data network of the scale envisioned by FDAAA. Thus, it
appears that a private operator only would be able to receive data from HIPAA-cov-
ered entities in coded form. This fact makes it impossible for the private operator to
link data from disparate sources longitudinally to create LPHD. Let us suppose the
private operator receives coded data relating to a particular patient from two different
sources-for example, clinical observations from the patient's oncologist and insur-
ance claims data from the patient's insurer. Each data set would have a different code
attached to it-one code generated by the doctor and a separate code generated by
the insurer. Without additional identifying information, the private operator would
be unable to ascertain that both of these coded data sets relate to the same person.
Therefore, the private operator cannot perform the required longitudinal linkage
between claims data and clinical observations. The HIPAA Privacy Rule presents a
legal barrier to private sector development of the needed infrastructure for supplying
LPHD for use in postmarket drug surveillance. By passing section 905 of FDAAA,
Congress deemed regulatory intervention to be necessary in order to resolve this bar-
rier and let private sector investment in infrastructure be mobilized.
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entities could assemble such a database, it would need ongoing regu-
lation to protect the privacy of persons whose data were included.
The Sentinel System exemplifies Professor G6mez-Ibdfiez's view
of infrastructure regulation as a response to debilitating transaction
costs. 66 High transaction costs can block the development of infra-
structure systems when property rights are ambiguous or widely dis-
persed.67 Ambiguous property rights are not a major problem in most
infrastructure industries.68 However, widely dispersed property rights
can be a problem, for example, in industries that require rights of way
to construct facilities. 69 Thus, the Natural Gas Act granted a power of
eminent domain to ease transaction costs in assembling rights of way
for pipeline projects approved by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) and its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) .70 Under federal law and the law of many states, individuals
do not have property rights in their own health data or stored tissue
specimens (from which genetic and other health data can be
derived).71 There have been various proposals to recognize such
66 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1624-25 (citing GOMEZ-IBA$JEZ, supra note 32, at
20).
67 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (ana-
lyzing how high transaction costs can affect societal and economic development);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing how allocation of pri-
vate intellectual property rights in genomic discoveries can impede biomedical
research); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998) (examining how the allocation of
private property rights can raise transaction costs and result in underutilization of
resources).
68 G6MEZ-IBAfJEZ, supra note 32, at 22; see also Chen, supra note 33, at 1627 (citing
Professor G6mez-Ibdfiez for the proposition that ambiguous property rights are not a
major source of transaction costs in infrastructure projects); Letter from Donald F.
Santa, Jr., President, Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am., to the Hon. John Cornyn,
Senator (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ingaa.org/cms/15/3560/3634/
3665.aspx (noting that pipeline operators successfully negotiate land-use agreements
with ninety to ninety-five percent of landowners in proposed pipeline pathways but
encounter barriers to access to remaining parcels of land).
69 GOMEZ-IBA$JEZ, supra note 32, at 5.
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006).
71 See Rina Hakimian & David Korm, Ownership and Use of Tissue Specimens for
Research, 292JAMA 2500, 2502-03 (2004). But see Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body?
A Patient's Perspective on Washington University v. Catalona, 34J. L. MED. & ETHICS 398,
400 (2006) (noting that some courts have held that human tissue outside the body
can be considered property of the individual or next of kin); Letter from Simon P.
Cohn, Chairman, Nat'l. Comm. on Vital and Health Stat., to the Hon. Michael 0.
Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 21, 2008), available at
http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/0802201t.pdf (recognizing the importance of individual control
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property rights. With or without them, individuals already have statu-
tory and regulatory privacy rights that require their specific, individual
authorizations before data can be released. These widely dispersed
rights for individuals to control access to their health data pose trans-
action costs similar those encountered in infrastructure industries that
rely on physical rights of way.
Congress could have addressed this problem by authorizing FDA
to fashion a new privacy rule for use in the context of its Sentinel
System. Congress did not take that approach. Instead, Congress man-
dated that the system must comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 72
How, then, does it help for FDA to become involved? The interplay of
FDAAA section 905 with the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides several
options73 through which FDA can make identifiable health data availa-
ble for private infrastructure operators (PIOs) to use in creating
LPHD for use in the Sentinel System. The scope of FDA's infrastruc-
ture regulatory mandate becomes clear only when section 905 and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule are read together.
The Privacy Rule struck a balance of public and private inter-
ests,7 4 recognizing that patients' desire to control access to their
over disclosures of health data, but not calling for an individual property right in such
data).
72 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3)(C) (i) (I) (West Supp. 2008).
73 In addition to HIPAA's public health exception, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (1) (i)
(2007), the Privacy Rule also contains a "health-oversight exception" that potentially
is relevant to the Sentinal System. Id. § 164.512(d)(1)(iii). This allows rclease of
data, without patient authorization, to an agency for use in verifying that regulated
entities are complying with regulations. Many, but not all, of the activities envisioned
in section 905 potentially fit within this HIPAA exception. HIPAA's "FDA exception,"
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (1) (ii), is something of a red herring for purposes of section
905. It allows disclosure of identified data without patient authorization for use in
postmarket surveillance and certain other activities relating to FDA-regulated prod-
ucts. However, it provides for disclosure of data to the "responsible person"-that is,
to the manufacturer of a drug that is subject to FDA regulation-rather than to FDA
itself. The FDA exception may be relevant, however, in resolving questions about
access to Sentinel System data by product manufacturers. The Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(i), provides procedures for waiver or alteration of HIPAA's usual authoriza-
tion requirements; this provides another avenue for obtaining data without a standard
HIPAA authorization. Finally, it might be possible to frame some Sentinel System
activities-particularly those that gather data to provide feedback and reports for
patients and physicians, as being part of "treatment" or "quality improvement," which
are outside HIPAA's authorization requirements.
74 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82462, 82691 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (discussing HHS'
rationale for balancing benefits of research against privacy risks in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin &James G. Hodge,Jr., Personal Privacy and Common
Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Pivacy Rule, 86
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health data occasionally must give way to important public needs,
such as reporting suspected instances of child abuse. Section 164.512
of the Privacy Rule grants various exceptions to the Privacy Rule's
usual requirement that individuals must authorize release of their
identifiable health information. One is the public health exception,
which lets a covered entity (such as a doctor or insurer) disclose a
patient's identifiable health data without the patient's authorization to a
governmental public health agency that is authorized by law to collect
such data to prevent or control injury or to conduct public health
surveillance and investigations. 75 FDAAA endows FDA with public
health responsibilities that appear to fit squarely within this HIPAA
exception. For example, FDA is responsible for evaluating and miti-
gating postmarket drug safety risks, 76 for reporting current drug safety
information to physicians and patients, 77 and for taking other steps to
reduce drug-related injuries. To carry out these new responsibilities,
FDA would be able to collect data for the Sentinel System without
patient authorization. Moreover-and this is the crucial point-the
so-called verification standards in section 164.514(h) of the Privacy
Rule let covered entities disclose data to persons acting on behalf of a
public official. 78 This means FDA can appoint external agents-who
could be PIOs-to receive any data FDA is entitled to receive. 79 FDA
simply needs to provide these PIOs with a written statement on gov-
ernmental letterhead or other evidence (such as a contract for ser-
vices) to show they are acting on FDA's behalf.
Through this subtle interplay of Section 905 and the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule, Congress has transmuted FDA into an infrastructure regula-
tor. FDA has the power, by handing a letter to a PIO, to grant it entry
into the business of collecting identifiable health data for use in mak-
ing LPHD for the Sentinel System. By rescinding the letter, FDA can
force the PIO to exit that business. By setting the terms under which
it will provide such letters, FDA can set rules to govern how that busi-
ness is conducted. This is infrastructure regulation in its classic Amer-
MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1441, 1470-72 (2002) (suggesting rules for balancing public and
private interests that apply to the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
75 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i).
76 FDAAA § 901, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(o), (p), 355-1 (West Supp. 2008).
77 Id. § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r).
78 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(h) (2) (ii)(C). The verification standards of section 514(h)
apply to any disclosure permitted under subpart E of HIPAA, and therefore apply to
disclosures made under the public health exception of 45 C.F.R § 164.512(b) (1) (i).
79 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
HIPAA Privacy Rule and Public Health, MoRBi DITr & MORTALITY, WKLY. REP., Apr. 11,
2003, at 1,1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/m2e4111 .pdf.
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ican form dating to the Interstate Commerce Act of 188780 and
subsequently imposed by Congress on the interstate shipping,8I stock-
yard,82 telephone, 83 telegraph,84 trucking,85 electricity,86 natural gas, 8 7
and aviation 88 industries. 89 This form of infrastructure regulation is
variously referred to as the "original paradigm,"90 discretionary regu-
lation,9' American public utility regulation, 92 and, in international cir-
cles, as the North American model.93  It persisted in U.S.
infrastructure regulation until the final quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, when it was partially supplanted by targeted market-based
reforms,94 a new paradigm that places greater reliance on competition
among infrastructure providers to protect the public from excessive
prices, discrimination in provision of services, and reliability
80 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.).
81 Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, 733-35 (1916) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. app.).
82 Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229b (2006)).
83 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 151-614 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)).
84 Id.
85 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
86 Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (codified as amended at scat-
tered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
87 Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (2006)).
88 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended and
before repeal at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
89 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 36, at 1333-34.
90 Id. at 1325.
91 Warrick Smith, Utility Regulators-The Independence Debate, PUB. POL'Y FOR PRIV.
SECTOR, Oct. 1997, at 2, available at http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Docu-
ment.1454.pdf (explaining that under a discretionary regulatory scheme a regulatory
commission or an individual regulator is granted substantial discretion to set prices
and services standards for the regulated firm); see also G6MEZ-IBAiJEZ, supra note 32, at
11-13, 27-32 (describing discretionary regulation as one of the available regulatory
alternatives); Chen, supra note 33, at 1628 (noting that "most American lawyers"
would call discretionary regulation "public utility regulation" (internal quotations
omitted)).
92 Chen, supra note 33, at 1628.
93 Peter L. Smith & Bj6rn Wellenius, Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunica-
tions, PUB. POL'Y FOR PRIV. SECTOR, July 1999, at 2, available at http://
rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/189smith.pdf (citing REGULA-
TIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT (Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1996)).
94 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1618.
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problems95-that is, from key risks that had been central to utility reg-
ulators' public-interest mandates under the old paradigm.
At its simplest minimum, the original paradigm of infrastructure
regulation allows private ownership of infrastructure but grants a reg-
ulator the legal authority: (1) to control market entry and exit by enti-
ties that will operate and/or use the infrastructure, and (2) to set
terms governing how the approved entrants will do business, so as to
serve a general public interest and/or to protect a specific vulnerable
class. This paradigm is often summarized as involving regulatory con-
trol over entry, exit, terms of service, and pricing.96 However, price
regulation is not actually an essential feature of this model. What is
essential is that the regulator be subject to some form of congressio-
nally defined mandate to protect the public. In utility industries, the
public-interest mandate often happened to include a statutory
requirement to ensure 'just and reasonable" pricing.9 7 Price regula-
tion was merely instrumental to fulfilling that mandate.
A better summary of the original paradigm is that it involves regu-
latory control over entry, exit, and terms of service, subject to a statu-
tory public-interest standard. The public-interest standard can, but
need not, include a mandate to protect against economic harms.
Infrastructure safety issues (for example, pipeline safety) also can jus-
tify restricting entry into an industry and regulating it on an ongoing
basis.98 Phillips notes that privacy risks have become important in
modern infrastructure regulation where, for example, electric utilities
possess information about consumers' usage patterns that would be of
interest to businesses advertising energy-efficient appliances.9 9 Tele-
communications regulators long have addressed concerns with privacy
of customers' telephone and telegraphic communications and, more
recently, have faced many other privacy issues, for example, unwanted
telemarketing calls and the privacy implications of new services like
caller ID. 100
Section 905's public-interest mandate focuses on drug safety and
privacy issues, rather than economic harms. Section 905's mandate
95 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 36, at 1333-40.
96 Id. at 1325, 1359-64; see also Chen, supra note 33, at 1618 (noting that the
regulation of infrastructure can be viewed as a "larger legal challenge of disciplining
monopoly").
97 See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (declaring unlaw-
ful any rate charged by a public utility "in connection with the transmission or sale of
electric energy" that is not "just and reasonable").
98 See PHILLIPS, supra note 37, at 60.
99 Id. at 562-63.
100 Id.
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has two parts: (1) a public health benefit standard-the Sentinel Sys-
tem must support specific authorized uses of data in drug safety activi-
ties that Congress has determined are in the American public's
interest-and (2) a patient protection standard to ensure privacy and
ethical protection of persons whose healthcare data are in the net-
work. Consistent with traditional U.S. infrastructure regulatory prac-
tice, the statute defines these standards in broad, open-textured
language leaving detailed interpretation to the agency's discretion.
A. The Section 905 Public Health Benefit Standard
Congress instructed FDA to develop the Sentinel System for spe-
cific, enumerated purposes: to identify drug safety risks based on elec-
tronic health data;10' to report data on serious adverse drug
experiences; 0 2 for active surveillance for risks using the Sentinel Sys-
tem data network;103 and to identify trends, report adverse events, and
export data for further analysis. 10 4 This further analysis includes
advanced studies done in collaboration with outside parties.' 0 5 Some
of these studies would be methodological in nature, to improve tech-
niques of risk-benefit analysis and make it timelier. 10 6 Significantly,
however, section 905(a) authorizes "routine access to outside exper-
tise to study advanced drug safety questions"' 0 7 and expressly allows
this outside expertise to include academic, private, and other public
entities.' 0
8
This "advanced drug safety question" clause grants FDA wide dis-
cretion to allow study of Sentinel System data by commercial and aca-
demic users. Such studies would need to be related to drug safety.
Notably, section 905 adopts an intriguing definition of "adverse drug
experience" that includes not just drug-related injuries, but efficacy
problems as well.' 09 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's con-
cept of safety" 0 implies a relative comparison of benefits and risks,'
so safety and efficacy always have been interrelated concepts. Section
101 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3)(C)(i) (I) (West Supp. 2008).
102 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (1I).
103 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (III).
104 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(rV)-(VI).
105 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(4)(A).
106 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A) (i), (iii).
107 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A) (ii).
108 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (A).
109 Id. § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1(b)(1); id. § 905, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(C)
(i) (II).
110 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)
(2006).
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905 makes this explicit by treating failure of expected pharmacologi-
cal action as a drug-related risk. This gives FDA wide latitude in defin-
ing the types of advanced drug safety study that warrant access to
Sentinel System data by outside users: any question addressing the
safety or efficacy of an FDA-approved drug is potentially included.
Appropriate uses of Sentinel System data under this clause might
include, for example, academic or commercial research to develop a
new pharmacogenetic test to let an existing drug be prescribed more
precisely so as to improve its safety or efficacy; or research to aid devel-
opment of a more effective version of an existing drug, to improve its
risk-benefit ratio and therefore improve its safety. FDA will be guided
by a public process through which its Drug Safety and Risk Manage-
ment Advisory Committee, or its successor, make recommendations
on priority drug safety questions and on whether such questions
should be addressed through use of Sentinel System data, post-
approval studies, or clinical trials. 112
B. The Section 905 Patient Protection Standard
Congress gave FDA several brief, specific instructions related to
the privacy of people whose data are in the Sentinel System. These
instructions are: (1) FDA must not disclose individually identifiable
health information when presenting, or responding to inquiries
about, drug safety signals (that is, data that suggest a possible drug
safety problem) and trends. 113 (2) When FDA shares Sentinel data
with outside data users, these users are under a similar obligation:
111 See Douglas C. Throckmorton, Acting Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Presentation on Efficacy Biomarkers: Efficacy/
Risk Assessment (Oct. 6, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/genomics/presentations_
20051006/051006 07_Throckmorton.pdf; see also CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 6010.3
(2007) [hereinafter CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES], available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/mapp/6010.3.pdf (discussing risk factors to include, and
not to include, when assessing the risk-benefit ratio for a drug); INT'L CONFERENCE ON
HARMONISATION OF TECH. REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARM. FOR HUMAN
USE, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E2E PHARMACOVIGILANCE PLANNING 2 (2005), available
at http://www.fda.gov/CBER/gdlns/ichpvp.pdf (explaining that FDA's "decision to
approve a drug is based on its having a satisfactory balance of benefits and risks within
the conditions specified in the product labeling"); INT'L CONFERENCE ON HARMONISA-
TION OF TECH. REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARM. FOR HUMAN USE, GUIDE-
LINES FOR INDUSTRY- STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF CLINICAL STUDY REPORTS 35 (1996),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/959fnl.pdf (outlining the unified
standard for reporting risk-benefit data from clinical trials to regulatory authorities).
112 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(4)(C) (West Supp. 2008).
113 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(I), (k)(4)(B).
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they must not disclose individually identifiable health information
when reporting drug safety signals and trends or when responding to
inquiries, but they may make lawful disclosures for other purposes. 1
14
Significantly, this instruction would let outside data users receive identi-
fiable data from the Sentinel System; it merely restricts their ability to
redisclose the identifiable information when reporting their study
results. (3) Outside data users must be placed under contractual obli-
gations to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Privacy Act.' 1 5
Note, though, that outside data users still would have an avenue for
redisclosing data-including identifiable data-under the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule's waiver and alteration provisions, 116 unless FDA imposes
further requirements that go beyond this minimal Congressional
instruction.1 17 (4) Outside data users must continue to observe these
privacy obligations after their contracts end, at which time they must
return or destroy the data. 11 8 (5) Outside data users that are part of
larger organizations must take measures to protect the security and
privacy of the data, and they may not share the data with other com-
ponents of their organizations without authorization. 1 9 This seems to
envision authorization from FDA, rather than from the persons whose
data are involved.
Beyond these minimal requirements, Congress gave FDA a gen-
eral instruction to establish and maintain Sentinel System procedures
that comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.1 20 As already discussed, the
Privacy Rule affords little direct, substantive protection of patient pri-
vacy. The Privacy Rule's public health exception is a trap door
through which the Sentinel System falls. Since Congress has author-
ized FDA to conduct public health related activities under section 905,
FDA can obtain identifiable health data without individual authoriza-
tions and can delegate its right to receive such data to outside parties
under the Privacy Rule's verification standards.
The core issues of privacy protection in this system will be: (1) To
which-and to how many-PIOs will FDA delegate its authority to
receive identifiable raw health data under the HIPAA public health
exception? (2) How broadly will FDA construe the statutory purposes
for which Sentinel System LPHD can be released-potentially in iden-
114 Id. § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (k) (4) (G) (i).
115 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). FDAAA section 905(a) requires
compliance with 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 and 552a. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (G) (i)(II).
116 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2007).
117 See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
118 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (G) (iii) (West Supp. 2008).
119 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (G) (ii).
120 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (i) (I).
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tifiable form-to outside data users? (3) What selection and qualifica-
tion criteria will FDA apply when choosing PIs and outside data
users? (4) Subject to what policies and on what terms will FDA release
data? (5) What processes will FDA follow when making these deci-
sions? (6) Will FDA's procedures result in an open, transparent deci-
sional process that affords due process to all interested parties, thus
meriting the public's trust? Congress left these questions-and with
them, the true scope and force of the Sentinel System's privacy protec-
tions-to FDA's discretion.
Concerning ethical issues (for example, human-subject protec-
tions), section 905 instructs FDA to convene a committee of experts in
data privacy and security to make recommendations to the Secretary
of HHS on "tools and methods for the ethical and scientific uses for,
and communication of' Sentinel System data.121 This scope of work
could encompass technical issues such as network security and verifi-
cation standards; policies regarding release of data to outside users in
identifiable, coded, and de-identified form;122 procedures for coding
of data and protection of code keys; and appropriate human-subject
protections when Sentinel System data are used in research. Thus,
ethical issues were delegated for the agency to address in its sole dis-
cretion, subject only to advisory committee input but not subject to
any congressionally defined standards. This broad delegation is con-
sistent with the approach Congress has taken when addressing ethical
and human-subject protection issues in various other contexts, such as
development of regulations to protect human subjects of federally
funded biomedical research.
123
II. COMPETING REGULATORY OBJECTIVES IN SECTION 905
FDA already is embroiled in classic infrastructure regulatory
problems, including the "fundamental problem in the law of regu-
lated industries"-how to get the infrastructure financed and built
and how to govern its use over a time frame so long as to preclude
accurate projections of demand, political pressure, and further tech-
nological innovation. 124 The Sentinel System amounts to pure green-
field infrastructure development-creating a new type of
121 Id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(3)(B)(iii).
122 See infra Part III.B.2 for definitions of these terms.
123 See, e.g., Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 289(a), 300v-1(b) (2000)
(authorizing creation of an advisory commission to examine issues in protection of
human-subject research and authorizing the Secretary of HHS, based on advice from
that commission, to develop appropriate regulations to protect human subjects in
certain federally funded research programs).
124 Chen, supra note 33, at 1617.
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infrastructure that never before has existed in the nation where it is
being built. FDA is an experienced product safety regulator but has
no staffing or experience that qualify it as an infrastructure regulator.
FDA's position is similar to that of new regulators in nations that priva-
tized infrastructure 125 or went through their first rounds of major
infrastructure installation 126 after 1980; or of U.S. railroad regulators
late in the nineteenth century; or of the FPC in the late 1930s and
1940s when improved steel technology first made long-haul interstate
pipelines feasible 127 and led Congress to pass the Natural Gas Act:
FDA is charged with ensuring completion and governance of a thing
that has no precedent and, even as construction is underway, must
hone its own regulatory mission and develop the institutional capacity
to carry it out.
FDA's challenge is to wield the discretion it has been granted to
achieve three objectives: (1) to protect privacy, (2) while letting the
Sentinel System be financed and used, (3) so as to achieve public
health benefits. FDA may encounter the "'sharp, often highly emo-
tional, sometimes violent economic and political combat"' that has
accompanied new infrastructure development in other contexts,'
28
because these objectives clash with one another. The clash of privacy
and public health benefits is obvious: if FDA construes advanced drug
safety studies broadly, this may enhance the system's public health
benefits but erode patient privacy as data are widely disseminated for
projects of diminishing marginal benefit. Construing the term too
narrowly may protect privacy at a cost of leaving important drug safety
issues unaddressed. Using patients' data without their authorization is
125 See Mary Shirley, Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't
Worked, PUB. POL'Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR, Aug. 1998, at 1, 1-4, available at http://rru.
worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/150shirl.pdf (surveying regulatory
methods used to privatize 565 state-owned enterprises in thirty-two countries); see also
Pierre Guislain & Michael Kerf, Concessions-The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Monopo-
lies, PUB. POL'Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR Oct. 1995, at 1 (discussing the use of concession
contracts as a regulatory tool in nations undergoing privatization of infrastructure
industries); Mary M. Shirley, Enterprise Contracts: A Route to Reform?, FiN. & DEv., Sept.
1996, at 6, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1996/O9/pdf/
shirley.pdf (discussing privatization and reform of state-owned infrastructure
industries).
126 See Klingebiel & Ruster, supra note 53, at 9 (explaining that government strate-
gies to induce private investment in infrastructure have often fallen short of intended
objectives because of a lack of a conducive environment for private participation in
infrastructure or faulty design of the strategies themselves); see also Smith, supra note
91, at 2-3 (discussing issues facing newly formed regulatory agencies).
127 PHILLIPS, supra note 37, at 693.
128 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1619 (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAw AND
MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 21 (1982)).
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justified-legally and ethically-only if the data actually serve an
important public interest. A crucial aspect of privacy protection is to
restrict the uses of data to their narrow, intended purposes. Wide-
spread dissemination of data for other uses would increase patients'
exposure to privacy risks.
The extent of integration within the data network is a key policy
decision and here, too, there is a clash between privacy and public
health benefits. The policy question is how far to go in linking data
from disparate sources-for example, claims data from different
health insurers-to form complete historical records of individuals'
health. One alternative, which minimizes privacy problems, is to keep
various insurers' data separate. If an individual happens to have data
in two insurance databases, those data would not be linked together to
form a comprehensive account of the person's medical history. Each
insurer's database would be an island in an archipelago that is the
Sentinel System. Targeted queries (such as, "How many people in
your database had heart attacks after taking Drug Y?") could be sent to
all participating insurers. Each island could report its answer to FDA
in anonymized form ("Without naming any names, we had 200 such
people."). Summing these responses for the entire archipelago yields
total statistics without transferring anyone's individually identifiable
health information off the island where it already resides. FDA has
suggested that it intends to pursue this approach, at least in the early
years of Sentinel System development. 129 As described at a May 2008
press conference, the system's query structure would relay questions
for insurers to analyze behind their respective privacy firewalls. Insur-
ers' responses-but not their complete data sets of identifiable claims
information-would be conveyed to FDA for centralized compilation
and analysis.
130
This island approach protects privacy, but it may miss important
safety information. This is particularly true with respect to latent risks
(or benefits) that emerge only after a long time period. Short-dura-
tion clinical trials are inherently unable to assess long-range effects.
For example, two-year clinical trials cannot assess the risk of taking
cholesterol-lowering statins for three or more decades-something
many Americans will be doing as chronic health problems appear in
ever-younger patients. One of Congress' many goals in approving the
Sentinel System was to improve detection of latent risks, which are
inherently unknowable at the time FDA approves new drugs. If FDA
129 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 48.
130 See Neal Learner, FDA's 'Sentinel Initiative'for Rx Safety Will Rely Heavily on Large
Health Plan Databases, AIS's HEALTH Bus. DAILY, June 16, 2008.
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relies too heavily on the island approach for protecting privacy, the
system may fail in this objective. Here is why: Americans under the
age of sixty-five change health plans frequently. Many people in this
age group are covered by employer-sponsored health plans that shop
insurers annually to seek the most economical coverage. If a patient
takes Drug Y while in one insurance plan, but switches to another plan
before suffering a heart attack, targeted queries of the two database
islands will not detect the adverse event. Putting two and two together
requires integrating data from both data sets; this linkage entails at
least some sharing of identifying information about the patient.
Medicare data will be somewhat helpful in studying long-term
risks and benefits. Patients who reach Medicare's threshold age
remain in the Medicare system from that point forward, supplying
continuous data over time. Yet Medicare patients, due to their
advanced age, may not live long enough to experience long-term risks
and benefits. Also, Medicare data cannot answer questions about
products aimed at younger patients such as acne medications and
childhood vaccines.13 1 If teenagers' acne medicines increase their
risk of skin cancer at age forty-five, we are unlikely ever to know it
unless individuals' health records can be linked longitudinally. The
needed data are scattered across many different private insurance
databases. An island approach to privacy makes it hard to answer
questions that easily could have been answered at a higher level of
data aggregation. The island approach may be appropriate as a transi-
tional step in the early years of Sentinel System operation, as FDA
develops infrastructure and privacy policies to support fully integrated
data operations in the future. However, significant integration of data
ultimately will be necessary, to fulfill Congress' public health objec-
tives. This integration will entail privacy risk.
There also is a clash between privacy and financing: LPHD have
value in many different commercial, research, and public health
applications. Once LPHD are created for use in the Sentinel System,
131 See, e.g., FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10, at 66-69 (statement of Dr.
Richard Platt) (describing recent efforts to resolve safety questions surrounding a
meningococcal vaccine approved in 2005). Vaccination against meningitis was rec-
ommended for all adolescents and, during its first fifteen months, 5.7 million doses of
the new vaccine were distributed. During this period, there were fifteen spontaneous
reports of Guillain-Barr6 syndrome, an inflammatory neurological condition that can
be lethal or paralyzing. Existing vaccine-safety databases allowed follow-up analysis of
100,000 vaccine doses-far too few to distinguish whether the observed rate of Guil-
lain-Barr6 was vaccine-related or simply background occurrence of this rare condi-
tion. See id. at 66-69. Medicare data would be useless in this context, since the
vaccine is used primarily in adolescents.
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the temptation will be to sell these data for unrelated, ancillary
uses. 132 Such sales could help defray the costs of system development.
Four contractors that proposed NHIN architectures to HHS all have
indicated that ancillary sales of data would be needed to help finance
system development. 133 The question of ancillary data sales also came
up during FDA's March 2007 public meetings to discuss the Sentinel
System.13 4 Public trust will live or die on how this issue is handled, yet
so may the system's financial viability. Congress authorized appropria-
tions of up to $25 million per year in each of the years 2008 to 2012 to
implement section 905 and a number of other postmarket drug safety
programs in Title IX of FDAAA. 135 The Sentinel System alone is likely
to cost much more than that, so FDA is directed to engage private
partners who will invest private capital in network development.
136
Relying on private infrastructure financing will leave FDA open to
commercial pressures. One can envision a scenario where a PIO is
supplying LPHD to FDA for use in its Sentinel System; FDA has come
to depend on these LPHD to perform important drug safety surveil-
lance activities; one day, the PIO announces it is losing money and will
soon go out of business unless FDA authorizes it to sell LPHD to other
users. The pressure will be to approve the ancillary sale to ensure
continued availability of FDA's own data supply. Can this conflict be
resolved without jettisoning privacy?
Ancillary sales of data may, at first, seem unproblematic from pri-
vacy and ethical standpoints, so long as FDA requires PIOs to de-iden-
tify the LPHD-or code them in a way that makes it highly unlikely
that the purchaser ever could re-identify them-before the LPHD are
sold. 137 Purchase and use of de-identified or coded LPHD would not
constitute "human-subjects research" under the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects (Common Rule) which is implemented
by HHS1'3 and seventeen other federal agencies. 139 HHS's Office for
Human Research Protection (OHRP) interprets research with de-
identified or coded health data as not being human-subjects research
132 See, e.g., FDA, March 8 Proceedings, supra note 43, at 151 (statement of Dr.
Alexander Ruggieri) ("People that have these data sources, which are very rich, could
potentially be tempted to pursue possible proprietary ventures with them.").
133 Id. at 144 (statement of Dr. Kelly Cronin).
134 Id. at 144-46; id. at 158 (statement of Dr. Richard Platt, discussing the general
need for resources to ensure prompt system development and the need for clarity
about permissible data uses and requirements for approving such uses).
135 FDAAA §§ 905(d), 908(a).
136 Id. § 905 (a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (c) (iii) (West Supp. 2008).
137 See infra Part II.B.2 for definitions of identified, coded, identifiable,
anonymized, and de-identified data.
138 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.124 (2007).
[VOL. 84:2
2009] INFRASTRUCTURAL MODEL OF MEDICAL PRIVACY 609
that requires informed consent. 140 Nor would the sale trigger
informed consent requirements under FDA's own human-subject pro-
tections,1 4 1 which apply to persons who are in clinical trials but would
not, unless amended, apply to patients whose data are in the Sentinel
System. 142 Finally, the ancillary sale would not disclose individually
identifiable health information under HIPAA, if de-identification and
coding are done in accordance with HIPAA standards. 143 Thus
HIPAA authorization would not be required.
Still, there is a legal and ethical pitfall that might be called the
provenance problem." The Sentinel System LPHD likely will be cre-
ated using identifiable health data that were released to PIOs under
HIPAA's public health exception. Any uses of those data-and, pre-
sumably, of the LPHD derived from them-must serve the statutory
public health purpose for which they were released. Congress's sole
public health concern in passing section 905 was to create LPHD for
use in addressing problems with postmarket safety of FDA-approved
products. 144 The HIPAA public health exception would be violated if
Sentinel System data were sold or disclosed for ultra vires uses, in
other words, uses beyond section 905's narrow statutory purpose. In
addition to staying within the scope of section 905, data uses also must
satisfy conditions imposed by HIPAA's public health exception itself.
Ancillary sales of the PIO's "output" (LPHD, even in de-identified
form) may violate the terms under which the PIO received the
"inputs" (identifiable raw health data) that were used in generating
the LPHD.
Section 905 authorizes a fairly broad range of uses of Sentinel
System data, but it will not support unlimited ancillary sales of the
data even in de-identified or coded form. To address the provenance
problem, FDA will need robust controls to ensure all uses of Sentinel
System data, including ancillary sales of LPHD, meet the following
criteria:
139 See Barbara J. Evans & Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research
Through Harmonization of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for
Research with Banked Specimens, 27J. LEGAL MED. 119, 120 n.5 (2006).
140 See Office for Human Res. Prots., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Gui-
dance on Research Involving Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens 6
(2004), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf [hereinaf-
ter OHRP 2004 Guidance].
141 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2008).
142 See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
143 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c) (2007).
144 See supra notes 101-09.
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(1) All data uses must serve the public health purposes of section
905 and, in addition, one of the following must be true:
(2) The proposed data use is within the scope of uses permitted
under HIPAA's public health exception, or
(3) The proposed data use is not consistent with HIPAA's public
health exception, but the HIPAA Privacy Rule otherwise allows FDA to
release the data to outside users and such uses comply with other reg-
ulations governing the use of individuals' health data (such as regula-
tions that protect human research subjects).
Unduly restrictive control over ancillary data uses-or unclear
policies related to such uses-could render Sentinel System infrastruc-
ture unfinanceable. On the other hand, overly permissive controls
could subject FDA to challenges, not only by patients whose privacy
allegedly was violated, but by commercial LPHD suppliers facing
unlawful competition from FDA's Sentinel System in the broader mar-
ket for LPHD. FDA's LPHD data set, when fully developed, will be
bigger and richer than competing, commercially available data sets. If
Sentinel System data were sold outside the purposes for which Con-
gress intended them, FDA and its PIOs might put other commercial
database operators out of business. Even if privacy advocates are una-
ble to mount effective legal challenges to ultra vires sales, competing
commercial database developers may have the wherewithal to do so.
Striking the right balance requires a clear understanding of the legal
boundaries on release of data to outside users. These boundaries cor-
respond to the three criteria just identified.
III. THE SCOPE OF ALLOWED DATA DISCLOSURES UNDER SECTION 905
This Part explores the range of data uses that is legally permissi-
ble, assuming FDA were to go to the full limit of the authority Con-
gress granted in section 905. Whether, to what extent, and how FDA
should exercise this authority are separate questions, discussed later
in this Article. This Part will give little comfort to persons concerned
about the privacy of their data in the Sentinel System. Section 905
and the HIPAA Privacy Rule would allow FDA to release Sentinel Sys-
tem data to outside users for a fairly wide range of public health and
research activities without individual privacy authorizations. Techni-
cally speaking, it would be lawful for FDA to release Sentinel System
data to outside users in identifiable form, although there is no reason
to expect that such disclosures will be commonplace. The more likely
scenario is ancillary sales of data that are not identifiable to the data
user (such as sales of data in anonymized or coded form). FDA's cur-
rent framework of human-subject protections does not apply to per-
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sons whose data will be in the Sentinel System. Even if FDA were to
adopt the Common Rule for the Sentinel System, data still could be
released to outside users in anonymized and coded form. Further,
the Common Rule provides at least two avenues for releasing data in
identifiable form without informed consent.
A. Keeping Data Uses Within the Scope of Section 905
Many Americans wish for medical privacy to mean that their data
can never be used or disclosed for any purpose without their consent.
Indeed, many members of the public think privacy does mean that.
145
In reality, the law has never recognized this form of privacy in situa-
tions where it collided important public health objectives. 1 4 6 It is a
truism that networked health infrastructure threatens to make privacy
risks more salient, since the chances of inadvertent or malicious dis-
closure go up, the farther the data go.1 4 7 Yet, simultaneously, this
infrastructure exposes, in stark terms, that medical privacy can carry a
mortal cost, if privacy is framed as an inviolable individual prerogative
to veto disclosures. Last year, FDA heard testimony that real-time sur-
veillance of insurance claims data for 7 million people could have let
cardiovascular risks of Cox-2 painkillers be detected thirty-four
months after sales began; with data for 100 million people, the prob-
lem could have been spotted in two or three months.1 48 The auton-
omy-based moral center of bioethics does not hold, if respect for
autonomy compels us to endure thirty-one avoidable months of Cox-2
casualties. This is not the clinical trials context, where an individual
can refuse to participate withoutjeopardizing discovery for society as a
whole. It is a public health context, where holdouts bias the data set
and reduce its statistical power for all of us.
145 See Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction to the
Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 481, 491 (2000)
(reporting a 1999 survey showing that ninety percent of Americans believe that shar-
ing health insurance records with other companies is an invasion of privacy).
146 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, PUBLIC HEALTH LAw 20-21 (2000).
147 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Health Privacy in the Electronic Age, 28 J. LEGAL MED.
487, 489 (2007) (discussing surveys indicating public concern with loss of privacy with
widespread adoption of electronic health records); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Fran-
cis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REv. 681, 700 (pointing out that systems with less interoperability pose fewer confi-
dentiality and security concerns, but cannot generate the potential health benefits of
an interoperable system).
148 FDA, March 7 Proceedings, supra note 10, at 70 (statement of Dr. Richard
Platt).
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The nub of the problem, always, lies in deciding which public
health objectives are sufficiently important to override the individual's
interest in nondisclosure. 149 Congress has determined that the spe-
cific data uses authorized in section 905 meet this measure of impor-
tance and are in the American public's interest. Congress delegated
to FDA the difficult task of deciding, on a day-to-day basis as concrete
study protocols come before it, which ones serve the purposes Con-
gress authorized. As is common in U.S. administrative law, FDA has
been given an open-textured, vaguely worded mandate: the agency is
to make data available for study of "advanced drug safety questions."
In like fashion, section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act 1 50 left it for regula-
tors to decide whether a proposed natural gas pipeline meets a vague
statutory public-interest standard: the facility must serve "the public
convenience and necessity."'151 The FERC (and its predecessor, the
FPC) interpreted this standard to mean that proposed pipelines must
meet specific criteria, such as being technologically sound, complying
with environmental laws, having adequate financial backing, having
reasonable costs so that rates will not be out of line with alternatives,
etc.' 52 Companies wishing to construct a pipeline under section 7(c)
must prove to the FERC that their project meets the criteria, in order
to receive a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPN).
Without a CPN, construction of a new facility is unlawful.'
53
In the same way, Congress left it for FDA to decide whether a
proposed use of Sentinel data serves the public health purposes of
section 905. If FDA decides that it does, then FDA lawfully can grant
access to Sentinel System data. One possibility is for FDA to review all
proposed uses of Sentinel System LPHD and approve those it deems
to be within the scope of section 905. FDA might adopt the procedu-
ral device of granting "Certificates of Public Health Benefit" (CPHBs)
to approved data uses. PIOs that operate the Sentinel System could
release data to a user lawfully only if the user is holding an FDA-
approved CPHB. Alternatively, FDA could enunciate criteria defining
broad classes of data use that FDA deems to be within the scope of
section 905, and let PIOs apply those criteria when granting access to
Sentinel System data.. This would be similar to the "blanket certifi-
149 See Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect Pri-
vacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (2002).
150 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2006).
151 Id. § 717f(c)(1)(A).
152 PHILLIPS, supra note 37 at 563-65; see alsoJohn Decker, Note, Authorization of
Natural Gas Pipeline Construction: Moving Decisions from Regulators to the Marketplace, 12
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 512 (1993).
153 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c).
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cate" approach the FERC adopted in 1982.154 It allows pipelines to
build certain types of new facilities without applying directly to the
FERC for project-specific CPNs, provided that they follow certain rules
and agree to certain conditions. 15 5 Under either approach, FDA
would define the criteria for approving outside data uses. The differ-
ence is whether FDA applies those criteria itself in a centralized review
process or allows the criteria to be applied in decentralized decisions
by PiOs.
PiOs naturally will want to be able to make as many ancillary sales
of de-identified or coded Sentinel System LPHD as possible; however,
FDA has a duty to ensure that all data uses are consistent with section
905. Section 905 does not rule out the possibility of ancillary sales.
The concept of "advanced drug safety question" in section 905156 is
broad enough to encompass a wide range of studies of drug safety and
efficacy. There may be many outside studies in which FDA does not
wish to collaborate directly, in the sense of devoting its own personnel
and financial resources to the study, which nevertheless fit within this
scope. Ancillary sales to persons conducting such studies would be
legally permissible. Section 905 allows access to Sentinel System data
for "collaborations" between FDA and private and academic entities,
but does not specify the precise form of collaboration. 157 Collabora-
tion could include some projects where FDA helps fund a project or
involves its own personnel in working closely with outside data users.
However, it also might include uses by private or academic entities
that are entirely responsible for funding and staffing the research and
merely agree to report their findings to FDA at the end of the project.
The precise terms of collaboration could be specified in the project-
specific CPHB, or in the conditions FDA sets when granting a PIO a
blanket certificate to make ancillary sales for classes of use FDA deems
to be in the scope of section 905.
One of the important lessons from infrastructure financing is
this: getting new infrastructure financed and built does not require
regulators to let PiOs do anything they want to do. It merely requires
a clear set of rules so that they can factor what they can and cannot do
into their financial planning.15 8 Financing major infrastructure does
154 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order No. 234, 47 Fed. Reg.
24,254, 24,266-24,274 (June 4, 1982) (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. pts 157, 284,
375 (2008)); see Decker, supra note 152, at 515-16.
155 Decker, supra note 152, at 515-16.
156 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k)(4)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2008).
157 See id., 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4).
158 See WoRLD BANK, GLoBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2004, at 161-62 (2004), (dis-
cussing how policies, institutions, and regulation can impede movement of capital to
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not require regulatory permissiveness so much as it requires regula-
tory predictability. A key issue in protecting privacy and in getting the
system financed is this: can FDA enunciate a clear set of criteria defin-
ing, in advance, which uses of Sentinel System data are going to be
permissible under section 905? In particular, can FDA provide clear
guidance on how the agency intends to interpret the phrase
"advanced drug safety questions" in FDAAA's section 905? Even if
FDA intends to review all proposed data uses itself, rather than giving
PIOs blanket authority to make sales subject to FDA-specified criteria,
the infrastructure developers still will need to know what the ground
rules for approval are going to be. Otherwise, they will not be able to
estimate future revenues and the system may not be privately finance-
able. Members of the public also have a stake in these ground rules:
the boundaries of permissible use are the boundaries of their medical
privacy.
B. Keeping Data Uses Within the Scope of Public Health Activities
If FDA relies on HIPAA's public health exception to obtain Senti-
nel System inputs, the criteria for approving external data uses must
address two issues: does the use fit within the scope of section 905 as
just discussed, and does it also meet additional conditions of the pub-
lic health exception? The latter question is whether proposed uses of
Sentinel System data constitute public health practice or research.
There are important ethical and legal distinctions between the two
concepts.1 59 While ethical norms support using people's health data
developing-country infrastructure), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
GDFINT2004/Home/20177154/GDF_2004%20pdf.pdf; Phil Burns & Antonio
Estache, Infrastructure Concessions, Information Flows, and Regulatory Risk, PUB. POL'Y FOR
PRIVATE SECTOR, Dec. 1999, at 1, 2, available at http://rru.worldbank.org/Docu-
ments/PublicPolicyJournal/203burns.pdf (discussing the importance of being able to
forecast, ex ante, "asset values, capital expenditure, depreciation, and operating
expenditure profiles, along with the cost of capital, in an attempt to deliver ex ante a
fair distribution of returns between shareholders and customers").
159 SeeJAMEs G. HODGE, JR. & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, COUNCIL OF STATE & TERRITO-
RIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE VS. RESEARCH 7 (2004), available at
http://www.cste.org/pdffiles/newpdffiles/CSTEPHResRptHodgeFinal.5.24.04.pdf;
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING PER-
SONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH (2004), available at http://privacyruleand
research.nih.gov/pdf/HIPAA-Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf; PaulJ. Amoroso &John P. Mid-
daugh, Research vs. Public Health Practice: When Does a Study Require IRB Review?, 36
PREVENTIVE MED. 250, 250-53 (2003); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra
note 79, at 6-11; James G. Hodge, An Enhanced Approach to Distinguishing Public Health
Practice and Human Subjects Research, 33J.L. MED. & ETHICS 125, 127 (2005); Dixie E.
Snider, Jr. & Donna F. Stroup, Defining Research When it Comes to Public Health, 112 PuB.
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in public health practice without their informed consent or privacy
authorization, it is far more problematic to bypass individual control
over disclosure of data for research. This distinction is reflected in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and in familiar human-subject protection
standards such as the Common Rule.
Both the Privacy Rule and the Common Rule conceive research
as a systematic investigation aimed at producing generalizable knowl-
edge. 160 Section 905's advanced drug safety studies are likely to
involve at least some activities that are in the nature of research. Any
intent to conduct research, whether primary or secondary to a public
health purpose, tends to support a finding that the activity is research;
however, it does not inevitably do so. The Sentinel System LPHD
likely will be created using identifiable health data that were released
to PIOs under HIPAA's public health exception. This provenance
raises a question whether any research use of these LPHD-by FDA,
by its collaborators, or by ancillary users-is permissible. Hodge and
Gostin point out the need to "unbundle" the various components of a
multifaceted public health program for separate ethical assessment.16
1
The fact that FDA's research into advanced drug safety questions is
part of a broader public health program does not, by itself, make it
public health practice.
1. Criteria for Distinguishing Public Health Uses from Research
HIPAA's public health exception is worded in a way that allows
various uses, including public health surveillance and public health
"investigations." 162 This latter term arguably is broad enough to
encompass advanced drug safety studies that produce generalizable
knowledge. However, the breadth of this language appears to have
never been interpreted by courts, so its scope is legally uncertain. To
avoid legal challenges, FDA would need to restrict outside data uses
(including ancillary sales) to studies that qualify as public health prac-
tice. This still would permit a wide range of data uses, including some
activities that produce generalizable knowledge.
HEALTH REP. 29 (1997); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Guidelines for Defining Public Health Research and Non-Research
(1999), http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/regs/hrpp/researchdefinition.htm; Office
for Prot. from Research Risks, Office for Human Research Prots., OPRR Guidance on
45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (b) (5): Exemption for Research and Demonstration Projects on
Public Benefit and Service Programs, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/gui-
dance/exmpt-pb.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter OPRR Guidance].
160 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2007); id. § 164.501.
161 See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 50.
162 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2007).
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Hodge and Gostin have restated the question of generalizability
as whether the activity in question produces findings that are general-
izable beyond the community whose data are involved (research) or
merely produces findings that are of benefit within that community
(public health practice). 163 Nationally scaled data networks like the
Sentinel System offer interesting possibilities for interpreting this dis-
tinction. At the conceptual limit, where one-hundred percent of the
present and future drug consuming "community" is in the data set,
benefits of studying the data are completely internal to that commu-
nity, and all data uses seemingly would be public health practice,
requiring no privacy authorization. If the data set were smaller, these
same studies would be research, producing results generalizable
beyond the study population; thus individual authorization would be
required. The larger a network data set grows, the less it requires
acquiescence of the people in it, when research is defined in terms of
generalizability. Large health databases achieve an ethically ironic
economy of scale: at the limit of their massiveness, when they swallow
up the private health data of everybody, they achieve their utmost eth-
ical purity. Research uses of Sentinel System data that involve large
data sets may produce findings that redound principally to the benefit
of the population involved. If so, this tends to support a finding that
the activity is public health practice, not requiring a privacy authoriza-
tion for the research.
However, no single criterion definitively distinguishes public
health practice from research. Various criteria have been proposed in
literature and in regulatory guidances. 164 Hodge and Gostin, survey-
ing these sources, suggest an enhanced decisional framework that de-
emphasizes traditional distinctions, such as whether the activity is car-
ried out by a private-sector or governmental entity, whether the results
will be published, whether the activity is a response to an urgent pub-
lic health crisis, and whether the source of funding is public or pri-
vate. I 65 Given the prevalence of public/private partnerships for
conducting traditional governmental functions, 166 these old distinc-
163 HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 51.
164 See supra note 159.
165 HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 48-50.
166 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1, 1 (1997);Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
155, 164-76 (2000);Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 543 (2000); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regu-
lation, 53 DuE LJ. 389, 389 (2003); Note, Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Reg-
ulation, 121 HA]v. L. REV. 1367 (2008).
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tions are no longer good indicators of whether an activity is public
health practice. Hodge and Gostin recommend a different set of cri-
teria. Some of these criteria relate to the general character of section
905 advanced drug safety studies, while others would need to be
assessed at the level of specific data use proposals.
For section 905's advanced drug safety studies, there is very spe-
cific legal authority for FDA to export Sentinel System data to outside
users for such studies, 167 and a corresponding duty for FDA to see that
the studies are carried out. This specificity tends to support a finding
that the studies are public health practice. 168 HIPAA's public health
exception requires data uses to be authorized by law. While "author-
ized by law" is not a defined term in HIPAA, HHS has construed it as
including actions that are permitted by law as well as actions that are
required by law. 169 Additionally, FDA's responsibility to protect per-
sons whose data are in the Sentinel System arises from the agency's
general ethical and legal duties as a public health authority rather
than through an individualized relationship as would exist between a
principal investigator and research subjects. This tends to support a
finding that Sentinel System research is public health practice rather
than research. 70 Finally, advanced drug safety studies with Sentinel
System data will not involve experimentation in the sense of introduc-
ing experimental products into test subjects. This also tends to sup-
port a finding that it is public health practice rather than research.
1 7'
FDA would need to apply the remaining criteria at the level of
specific proposals to use Sentinel System data: (1) If findings are
generalizable beyond the community included in the study, this tends
to support a finding that the activity is research rather than public
health practice. 72 However, as just discussed, studies with large,
inclusive data sets may tend to qualify as public health practice under
this criterion. (2) Public health activities are premised on improving
the health of participants, as opposed to research activities where
there may be no expectation of benefit for the individual research
167 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4), (k) (4) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 2008).
168 See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 50-51.
169 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 79, at subsection titled
"Disclosures for Public Health Purposes"; see also Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,929 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999)
(proposing rules to protect the privacy of individually identifiable health information,
including procedures and authorized and required uses of such information).
170 See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 51.
171 See id. at 52.
172 Id. at 51.
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subject.1 73 Drug safety studies are quite likely to benefit the persons
whose data is used, since many of them have an established history of
taking the particular drug under study or have a condition for which
that drug is widely prescribed. Many advanced drug safety studies will
satisfy this criterion, although this, also, needs to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. (3) Persons in the Sentinel System database are not
selected by researchers in the same way human research subjects are
screened and selected prior to collecting data about them. Instead,
people in the database self-select by choosing to be treated with a drug
that later generates an advanced drug safety question. This supports a
finding of public health practice. 174 However, this, too, is a question
best addressed in the context of particular studies. If the study design
employs control groups or randomly selects data records to eliminate
bias, it may be research rather than public health practice. 75 (4)
While publication of results is not a dispositive factor, studies that
intend to supply data for use in meeting FDA's drug safety reporting
obligations would be more likely to qualify as public health
practice.
176
It is likely that many advanced drug safety studies will qualify as
public health practice. However, it may be difficult for FDA to enun-
ciate clear criteria, in advance, for distinguishing public health prac-
tice from research. Unless the agency can enunciate such criteria, it
should not delegate authority for PIOs to make their own decisions
about permissible ancillary sales. FDA may be able to specify certain
broad classes of activity that unquestionably qualify as public health
practice, and PIs could be granted blanket authority to release data
for those classes of activity without direct FDA review of each pro-
posed data use. However, FDA still would need to perform case-by-
case reviews of proposed data uses that do not fit in the allowed cate-
gories. It is therefore likely that FDA will need a centralized review
process, at least for the ambiguous cases, and possibly for all proposed
data uses if clear criteria cannot be enunciated in advance. Moreover,
if FDA does grant blanket authority to PIOs, FDA will need effective
reporting and auditing procedures to make sure PIs do not make
ancillary sales that go beyond the approved classes of use.
173 Id. at 52.
174 Id. at 52-53.
175 See id. at 53.
176 Id. at 49.
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2. Release of Identifiable Data Under HIPAA's Public Health
Exception
It is common practice, when public health agencies release data
under HIPAA's public health exception, to take steps to reduce pri-
vacy risks to the persons whose data are involved. 17 7 These steps often
include anonymizing the data (removing names and other overtly
identifying information, such as patient numbers) or coding it. Multi-
ple, conflicting terminologies are used to characterize the degree of
linkage between data and individuals' identities.' 78 In this Article, I
will use "anonymized" to refer to data that have had patient identifiers
completely and irrevocably removed before disclosure, such that
future re-identification would be impossible. Anonymized data are of
limited use in drug safety studies, since anonymization makes it impos-
sible to correlate research findings with subsequent clinical observa-
tions. 179 In this Article, the term "coded"'8 0 refers to data that have
177 See Myra Moren et al., Living With the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 32J.L. MED. & ETHICS
73, 76 (2004) ("In spite of the Privacy Rule's public health exemptions, provider orga-
nizations have concerns about releasing data.").
178 The HIPAA Privacy Rule recognizes two major categories of informational
linkage: identified health information (which generally requires a signed authoriza-
tion before it can be used by or disclosed to others) and de-identified health informa-
tion (which can be disclosed and used without an authorization). However, HIPAA
de-identified health information can be coded in a way that allows re-identification or
can be supplied without such a code. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2) (i) (R), (c) (2007).
Thus, HIPAA in effect has three categories: (1) identified; (2) dc-identified but
coded; and (3) de-identified and uncoded. De-identifying data under HIPAA
requires either certification by a statistician that the risk of re-identification is very
small, id. § 164.514(b) (1), or removal of eighteen specific types of information, some
of which (such as dates of treatment) is potentially useful in drug safety studies, id.
§164.514(b). HIPAA's concept of de-identification is potentially more stringent than
the concept of "anonymyzation" reflected in other commonly used terminologies.
See OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 6-7. For examples of other common
terminologies, see INT'L CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION OF TECH. REQUIREMENTS FOR
REGISTRATION OF PHARM. FOR HuMAN USE, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: El5 DEFINITIONS
FOR GENOMIC BiomARKERs, PHARMACOGENOMICS, PHARMACOCENETICS, GENOMIC DATA
AND SAMPLE CODING CATEGORIES 4-7 (2008) [hereinafter ICH GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/ichel5term.pdf; NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
1 RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS i tbl.1 (1999), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/nbac-biologicall .pdf;
Pharmacogenetics Working Group, Terminology for Sample Collection in Clinical Genetic
Studies, 1 PHARMACOGENOMICSJ. 101 (2001).
179 See Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at 126-28.
180 My use of "coded" to imply segregation of code keys from the data user corre-
sponds to terminology developed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in
1999. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 178, at i tbl.1. The require-
ment that code keys be segregated from data users is also consistent with OHRP's
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been stripped of overtly identifying information (such as names or
patient identification numbers) and labeled with a code, with the
code key inaccessible to the data user. 181 Segregating code keys from
data users renders data unidentifiable, by which term I mean "uniden-
tifiable by the data user."18 2 Data users, acting alone without coopera-
tion of the code key holder, would not be able to link coded data to
specific individuals. If data users do have access to the code key or
other information from which they could trace data to particular indi-
viduals, the data would be considered "identifiable," that is, identifi-
able by the data user. "Fully identified" data, in this Article, are data
that have been conveyed to the data user with overtly identifying infor-
mation such as names or patient numbers. Fully identified data are a
subset of identifiable data.
HIPAA's public health exception allows Sentinel System data to
be shared with outside users without privacy authorizations, provided
that the use qualifies as public health practice. Although many public
health agencies do anonymize or code data when making such disclo-
sures, HIPAA's public health exception does not require them to do
so.18 3 A matter of great concern is that HIPAA's public health excep-
current policy for unconsented use of coded specimens and health data under the
Common Rule. See OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 2-4. It also is consistent
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule's standard for determining whether coded data or speci-
mens can be treated as de-identified; this standard requires nondisclosure of code
keys. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c).
181 FDA's new International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) terminology
recognizes two subcategories of coding, one of which segregates code keys from the
investigator/data user. The other does not necessarily do so. See ICH GUIDANCE,
supra note 178, at 4-5. In ICH terminology, "double-coded" data are coded twice,
and the data user has no access to at least one of the code keys. The data user, acting
alone, would not be able to re-identify double-coded data, so these data would qualify
as "coded" in the sense envisioned in this Article. ICH also recognizes a category of
"single-coded" data, for which the investigator/data user may have access to the code
key. If the investigator has code-key access, ICH "single-coded" data would not qualify
as "coded" under my terminology or under the National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion terminology or under OHRP's 2004 Guidance, nor could it be considered "de-
identified" under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. See id.
182 In other contexts, such as in determining whether informed consent is
required under the Common Rule, "identifiable" data are generally understood to
mean "identifiable by the data user," for example, the data may be coded, so that the
data user does not receive overtly identifying information such as the names or social
security numbers of people who are in the database, but the data user has access to
the code key and could re-identify the data without enlisting the cooperation of any
third parties (such as FDA, the P1O, or a trustee that holds the code key). Under the
Common Rule, coded data are not regarded as identifiable by the data user if the data
user has no access to the code key. See OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 3-4.
183 See supra note 73.
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tion technically would allow release of Sentinel System data to outside
users in identifiable or even fully identified form. Section 905 also
would allow this, provided the outside data users comply with certain
conditions (such as, not redisclosing identifiable information when
reporting their findings, and agreeing to be bound by the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule and other provisions that deter redisclosure).184 Thus, FDA
has legal authority to allow release of identifiable data to outside data
users.
It is doubtful that FDA intends to approve release of identifiable
data as a routine matter, since identifiable data are not really needed
for many types of advanced drug safety study. Most study objectives
can be achieved with coded, rather than identifiable, data.1 85 Coding
of data affords a high degree of privacy protection if coding is prop-
erly done, with segregation of code keys from data users and with
enforceable penalties for mishandling the code keys. Coding gener-
ally renders patients unidentifiable by investigators who are working
with their data, as well as by others who might come into possession of
the data via the investigators.18 6 At the same time, coding lets
research findings be correlated with subsequent clinical observations
and would let FDA, or its code-key trustee, trace data back to individ-
ual patients when follow-up observations or data collection are
required. FDA's policy on outside uses of Sentinel System data should
require use of coded data, rather than data that are identified or iden-
tifiable by investigators, whenever this is consistent with study
objectives.
Identifiable data occasionally are needed, for example, if the pur-
pose of a study is to screen Sentinel data to find suspected cases of a
particular adverse drug reaction and then follow up directly with
patients or their physicians to ascertain reasons for the problem.
Given the important interests at stake when a proposed study needs
identifiable data, FDA should maintain tight control over approval of
such requests and should provide ongoing oversight of each such
study. Release of identifiable data is not suitable for a blanket-certifi-
cate approach that lets PIOs make their own decisions to release iden-
tifiable data subject to FDA-approved criteria. Each such request
should be separately and directly approved by FDA. Essential charac-
teristics of public health practice are direct performance or oversight
by a governmental public health authority (or its authorized partner)
184 See supra Part I.B.
185 See Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at 127.
186 Id.
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and accountability to the public for its performance.18 7 To the extent
that HIPAA's public health exception allows release of identifiable
data, the agency should remain directly accountable to the public for
those releases.
C. Ensuring Ethical Research Use of Sentinel System Data
The scope of advanced drug safety studies under section 905 is
broad enough to include activities that will not qualify as public health
practice and would have to be regarded as research. Releasing Senti-
nel System data for research presents ethical issues when data have
been obtained under HIPAA's public health exception. Section 905
instructs FDA to convene a committee of experts to advise the Secre-
tary on ethical issues surrounding the use and communication of
data.1 88 Whether to allow research with Sentinel System data is an
obvious item to include on that committee's agenda. 189 If research is
deemed to be ethically permissible, then the Privacy Rule's waiver pro-
vision, 190 described below, supplies a legal basis for releasing data to
researchers. If FDA pursues this course, several follow-up questions
need to be addressed: (1) Would release of data for research under
HIPAA's waiver provision violate public trust and, if so, should FDA
implement a waiver process that affords better protections than the
Privacy Rule requires? (2) What should FDA's policy be regarding
research with data in identified or identifiable, coded, and
anonymized form? (3) What framework of human subject protections
should FDA adopt for research uses of Sentinel System data? These
questions are discussed below.
1. HIPAA Provisions for Waiver of Privacy Authorization
The Privacy Rule contemplates that data in public health
databases sometimes will be released for use in research; this can
include release of data in identified or identifiable form. An Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB) or Privacy Board of the HIPAA-covered
entity that holds the data can waive or alter HIPAA's usual authoriza-
tion requirement.191 A waiver allows data to be used with no individ-
187 See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 159, at 8.
188 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (B) (iii) (West Supp. 2008).
189 FDA's proposed organizational structure includes a research component, so
this decision already may have been made. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note
4, at 16.
190 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2007).
191 See id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i).
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ual authorization at all. An alteration lets data be used subject to
modified procedures for obtaining individual authorizations.
192
The body (either an IRB or Privacy Board) that approves the
waiver must document that the research poses minimal privacy
risks. 193 For this purpose it is sufficient that there be an "adequate
plan" to protect the identifiers from improper use and disclosure; an
"adequate plan" to destroy identifiers at the earliest opportunity con-
sistent with research objectives (which could mean "never," so long as
justification is given for retaining the identifiers indefinitely); and
"adequate" written assurances that the data will not be reused or dis-
closed. 194 Also, it must be documented that the research would be
impracticable without the waiver and without access to the identifiable
health data.19
5
The glaring issue here is, "Whose IRB or Privacy Board has the
power to make these decisions?" Under HIPAA, an IRB or Privacy
Board constituted by any HIPAA-covered entity that lawfully holds
data has the power to approve a waiver. 19 6 Section 905 requires
outside data users to agree, contractually, to become HIPAA-covered
entities. 19 7 As such, they would have the power to grant waivers. Thus
there is little real privacy protection in section 905's requirement for
outside parties to agree to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule. To
earn any public trust, FDA must go beyond this minimal requirement.
FDA should require all PIOs and outside data users to relinquish their
rights to exercise HIPAA's waiver provision to redisclose Sentinel Sys-
tem data. This is absolutely necessary with respect to releases of iden-
tified or identifiable data. It also may be desirable with respect to
releases of coded data, although there are other ways to address pri-
192 An example of an alteration would be to use passive ("opt-out") consent. This
involves giving some form of public notice of plans to use data in a particular research
study. For example, this might include publishing notice of the research study in
newspapers or on websites known to be frequented by persons whose data the
researcher wishes to use. The notice describes the data ("all claims submitted to XYZ
insurance company between 2004 and 2006"). It then provides a contact address or
telephone number to which insured persons can respond if they do not want their
data used in that study. If they fail to reply, it is presumed that their data may be used
in the study. There are non-U.S. examples of passive consent procedures and at least
one reported U.S. example where passive consent was used under HIPAA's alteration
provisions. See Benjamin Littenberg & Charles D. MacLean, Passive Consent for
Clinical Research in the Age of HIPAA, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 207 (2006).
193 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2) (ii).
194 Id. § 164.512(i) (2) (ii) (A)(1)-(3).
195 Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii)(B)-(C).
196 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 79, at 5-6.
197 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (4) (G) (i) (I) (West Supp. 2008).
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vacy concerns with coded data (for example, by adopting human-sub-
ject protections for the Sentinel System that set clear standards for
coding and handling of code keys). 198 At a minimum, FDA should
centralize and control the process for exercising HIPAA's waiver pro-
vision to approve research uses of identifiable or fully identified data.
Even if FDA centralizes this function in its own IRB or Privacy
Board, there still are problems due to procedural weaknesses of the
Privacy Rule itself. If the Privacy Rule currently enjoys public trust, it
is a fragile trust that rests on the public's ignorance of what its waiver
provisions actually allow. FDA would be well advised to implement a
more formal and transparent waiver-approval process than the Privacy
Rule requires. Under the Privacy Rule, an IRB that is approving a
waiver must follow the usual procedural norms of the Common Rule
for IRB decisionmaking. 199 The Common Rule lets decisions be made
in nonpublic proceedings by simple majority voting of a group that
may be-and usually is-staffed primarily by insiders of the entity that
holds the data,200 subject only to scant and occasional oversight by an
external regulator.201 HIPAA Privacy Boards, also staffed primarily by
insiders, proceed in their usual manner although, when granting waiv-
ers, they are required to have a majority of their members present and
include at least one person who is not an insider of the entity that is
releasing the data. 20 2 This lone non-insider does not have a veto and
can easily be outvoted. Moreover, HIPAA allows an alternative, expe-
dited procedure where the Privacy Board chair can approve a waiver
198 See infra Part III.C.2.
199 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2) (iv) (A) (2007).
200 See id. §§ 46.103(b) (3), 46.108(b).
201 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM 9, C-3, C-4 (1998) [hereinafter
OIG, IRB A TIME FOR REFORM], available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-
01-97-00193.pdf (indicating that FDA aims to inspect IRBs that operate under FDA's
regulations once every five years); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THEIR ROLE IN REVIEWING
APPROVED RESEARCH 3 (1998) [hereinafter OIG, IRB ROLE IN REVIEWING], available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00190.pdf (estimating that
2,000-5,000 IRBs are in operation at academic medical centers and research institu-
tions in the U.S.); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 8, 9, 16 (2000) [hereinafter OIG,
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS], available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-
97-00197.pdf (finding on-site and spontaneous reviews of IRBs operating under the
Common Rule are extremely rare, with only eighteen site visits between 1990 and
April 1996; one such visit between April 1997 and May 1998; and ten visits between
June 1998 and March 2000).
202 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2) (iv) (B) (2007).
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acting alone or can appoint one or more individuals to make the
decision.
203
FDA simultaneously will be acting as regulator of Sentinel System
privacy and as a major consumer of Sentinel System data.204 These
dual roles imply a conflict of interest. Since ancillary sales of data
help defray costs of system operation, they could reduce the cost of
data FDA acquires for its own uses. If FDA's own IRB or Privacy Board
is in charge of approving waivers to enable ancillary sales, FDA's con-
flict of roles will, at the very least, pose problems of public perception.
This is all made worse by the procedural weakness of HIPAA's waiver
provisions, which fall far below basic due process norms expected in
other infrastructure regulatory contexts where a regulator is making
determinations that have mandatory effect on the public and which
prejudice the interests of affected parties. 20 5 People whose data are
released under HIPAA's waiver provisions are entitled, if they come
forward and request it, to receive a brief accounting of such releases
after the releases occur.20 6 They have no predeprivation due process
right to be notified that a waiver is under consideration. They have
no right to be heard before the waiver is approved, nor are they enti-
tled to receive notice that their data have been released, even after the
fact. Finally, there is scant reviewable record of IRB or Privacy Board
deliberations or of the criteria applied when determining that privacy
protections were "adequate" and privacy risks were "minimal." To
merit public trust, FDA must implement a waiver process that goes
considerably beyond what the Privacy Rule requires.
2. FDA Policy on Research Use of Identified, User-Identifiable,
Coded, and Anonymized Data
Section 905 and the Privacy Rule allow release of data in identifi-
able form to outside parties. If the data use qualifies as public health
practice, such releases are lawful under HIPAA's public health excep-
tion.20 7 If the data use is research, the additional step of approving a
waiver is required. 20 8 In practice, most IRBs and Privacy Boards con-
sidering a waiver likely would not regard privacy risks as "minimal"
when identifiable data are involved; thus they would not grant the
203 Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)().
204 See supra Part II.
205 See G6MEZ-IBA-NEZ, supra note 32, at 19 (discussing the need for elaborate pro-
cedural safeguards in coercive regulatory decisionmaking).
206 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2007).
207 See id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i).
208 See supra Part III.C.1.
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waiver. As a point of law, however, identifiable data can be released
under HIPAA's waiver provision. This could occur if the party receiv-
ing identifiable data had given convincing assurances that the data
would be handled carefully, and the IRB or Privacy Board was satisfied
that privacy risks were indeed "minimal."20 9 HHS's Office of Civil
Rights, which administers the HIPAA Privacy Rule, has never provided
clear guidance on specific conditions that must be met in order for
privacy risks to be minimal. OHRP, which administers similar waiver
provisions under the Common Rule, also has never clarified the term.
Its meaning is left to discretion of IRBs and Privacy Boards which, as
noted, have conflicts of interest and operate with little transparency or
public accountability.
210
Ethical and privacy considerations demand that release of identi-
fiable data from the Sentinel System should be the rare exception,
rather than a common occurrence, as already discussed. 211 If FDA
adopts a decentralized decisional model that allows PIOs to make
ancillary sales of data for research use subject to FDA-approved crite-
ria, FDA still should maintain centralized control over releases of
identified data and data that would be identifiable by the data user.
At most, PIOs should only have discretion to release data in
anonymized form or in coded form, subject to clear requirements to
segregate code keys from the data recipients and subject to effective
auditing and enforcement. All releases of Sentinel System data, in
whatever form, should be subject to an FDA-approved framework of
human-subject protections.
3. Human-Subject Protections in Research with Sentinel System
Data
For readers desiring a short cut through this discussion, which is
technical in nature, the conclusions are: FDA currently has no frame-
work of human-subject protections for research with Sentinel System
data. FDA may wish to consider adopting the Common Rule for this
purpose. However, even if FDA does adopt the Common Rule, there
still are avenues for release of anonymized, coded, identifiable, and
identified data without informed consent when necessary to support
FDA-authorized research with Sentinel System data.
FDA's current research ethical framework does not define
"human subjects" in a way that supports meaningful distinctions
among data that are fully identified, identifiable by researchers,
209 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
211 See supra Part III.B.2.
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coded, or de-identified/anonymized. 12 Moreover, FDA's human-sub-
ject protections, in their current form, would not apply to section 905
advanced drug safety studies. FDA's regulations were designed for
clinical trials and define "human subject" as "an individual who is or
becomes a participant in research, either as a recipient of the test arti-
cle or as a control."213 Persons whose data are in the Sentinel System
do not meet this definition, so their informed consent is not
required. 214 Nor does IRB review appear to be required. FDA's IRB
regulation is identical to the Common Rule in terms of how IRBs are
constituted and what functions they perform. 215 However, FDA's IRB
regulation does not define circumstances that trigger an IRB review.
Instead, provisions elsewhere in FDA's regulations invoke IRB review
in specific relevant contexts.21 6 At present, there are no provisions
212 See Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at 138.
213 21 C.F.R. § 50. 3 (g) (2008) (informed consent regulation); id. § 56.102(e)
(IRB review).
214 In recent years, similar problems have surrounded the status of persons whose
tissue specimens are used in FDA-regulated research. See Evans & Meslin, supra note
139, at 138. In 1999, FDA attempted to construe its regulations as requiring informed
consent for the use of coded or identified tissue specimens in medical device
research. See DIv. OF BIORESEARCH MONITORING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF: REGULATING In Vitro Diagnostic Device (IVD) Stud-
ies 4 (1999), http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/comp/ivdreg.pdf. In doing so, FDA relied on
a definition of "human subject," elsewhere in its investigational device exemption reg-
ulations, that includes persons "on whose specimen" research is performed. 21 C.F.R.
§ 81 2 .3 (p) (2007). However, there is no definition anywhere in FDA's regulations
that includes persons on whose data research is performed. FDA's 1999 Guidance was
challenged as amounting to a de facto amendment of FDA's informed consent regula-
tion without proper administrative procedures. Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at
143-62. In 2006, FDA issued a new Guidance that lets researchers who do not wish to
follow the 1999 Guidance voluntarily opt into a regime that lets coded specimens be
used in research without informed consent, provided certain steps are taken to pro-
tect the privacy of people whose specimens are used. See Guidance on Informed Con-
sent for In Vitro Diagnostic Device Studies Using Leftover Human Specimens That
Are Not Individually Identified 71 Fed. Reg. 23,924, 23,924-25 (Apr. 25, 2006);
OFFICE OF IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE EVALUATION & SAFETY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON INFORMED CONSENT FOR IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE
STUDIES USING HUMAN SPECIMENS THAT ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE (2006),
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/guidance/1588.pdf. This 2006 Guidance, which
applies only to medical device research and not to drug research, is generally consis-
tent with OHRP's policy on research use of coded tissue specimens. See OHRP 2004
Guidance, supra note 140. However, FDA did not address the issue of research with
coded health data, either in medical device research or more generally.
215 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2008).
216 See, e.g., id. § 312.23(a) (1) (iv) (requiring sponsors' commitment to IRB review
of clinical studies in the context of investigational new drug applications); id.
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expressly requiring IRB review when Sentinel System data are used in
research.
There is much to be said for having FDA adopt the Common
Rule to govern research uses of Sentinel System data. This need not
disrupt FDA's continued use of its existing human-subject protections
in clinical trials. FDA could implement the Common Rule solely for
use in the Sentinel System. Doing so would facilitate collaborations
with academic entities already subject to the Common Rule, whether
because their studies of Sentinel System data are being federally
funded or because they have signed a Federalwide Assurance that
places all of their research under the Common Rule. 217 Adopting the
Common Rule also would avoid the appearance that different types of
data in the Sentinel System are entitled to different levels of human-
subject protection: Medicare data are supplied by HHS and HHS
implements the Common Rule; 21 8 are data from other sources, such
as private health insurers, entitled to any less protection? Finally, the
Common Rule's definition of "human subject" appropriately recog-
nizes that privacy risks to research subjects vary, depending on the
amount of identifying information researchers receive about them. 219
It supports meaningful distinctions among identified, identifiable-by-
the-researcher, coded, and de-identified data.220 This is a crucial con-
cept for purposes of managing risks to persons whose data are
included in a data network.
If FDA did place the Sentinel System under the Common Rule,
would the Common Rule require informed consent of people whose
data are used in advanced drug safety studies? For research with
anonymized or coded data, the answer clearly is, "No." The Common
§ 314.50(d) (3) (i) (requiring a statement that each study was conducted in compli-
ance with IRB regulations as part of the application for FDA approval of a new drug).
217 See Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at 134-38; see also OIG, IRB ROLE IN
REVIEWING, supra note 201, at B-1 (estimating that seventy-five percent of research
funded by the National Institute of Health is carried out at research institutions that
have voluntarily agreed to apply the Common Rule to all research at their
institutions).
218 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-124 (2007).
219 See OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 2-4; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f)
(defining human subject as "a living individual about whom an investiga-
tor.., conducting research obtains (1) data through intervention or interaction with
the individual, or (2) identifiable private information"); id. § 46.101 (b) (4) (exempt-
ing human subject research involving the collection or study of information "that is
publicly available or ... is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects" from
human subject research protection under the regulations).
220 See Evans & Meslin, supra note 139, at 140-41.
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Rule, interpreted by OHRP's 2004 Guidance, would not require
informed consent for such releases, provided code keys are inaccessi-
ble to the outside data user. 221 This same Guidance sets standards for
coding and protection of code keys. 2 2 2 Sentinel System procedures
would need to meet or exceed those standards. FDA may, in fact, wish
to set higher standards. OHRP's 2004 Guidance relies heavily on con-
tractual assurances that code keys will be protected and lacks clear
provisions for auditing and enforcing performance of the contracts.
2 23
The Sentinel System's coding standards should include credible
mechanisms to reassure the public that standards actually are being
enforced.
The remaining question is whether the Common Rule requires
informed consent for release of data in identified or identifiable form.
The answer is, "Not necessarily." The Common Rule generally does
require informed consent for research with data that are identifiable
by the research investigator.224 However, the Common Rule provides
four different legal pathways for unconsented use of such data. Two
of the pathways are not entirely serviceable in the context of Sentinel
System advanced drug safety studies. However, the other two path-
ways would support unconsented release of identifiable (or identified)
data for such studies.
The two pathways that appear not to work are the Common Rule
exemptions225 most frequently invoked when there is a need to
arrange unconsented research use of identifiable data. One of these,
the exemption at 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4), allows unconsented
research with existing data in identifiable form, provided the investi-
gator records information in a way that would not let subjects be re-
identified. At first glance, this seems to match what section 905 allows:
outside parties conducting advanced drug safety studies may use iden-
tifiable data from the Sentinel System, but may not report results in a
way that includes identifiable information. 226 The problem is that
OHRP has construed "existing" data to mean data that existed at the
time the IRB approved the exemption-that is, prior to the start of
the study.227 Thus the section 46.101(b)(4) exemption would not
support advanced drug safety studies that intend to use data received
221 OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 4-6.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 3.
224 See id. at 2-6.
225 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (4)-(5) (2007).
226 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (4) (G) (i) (West Supp. 2008).
227 See Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Div. of Compliance Oversight, Office for
Human Research Prots., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Daniel E. Ford,
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into the Sentinel System after the studies commence. This precludes
correlation of research findings with subsequent clinical observations.
Technically, there are ways around this problem; for example, FDA
could establish a continuously active IRB that re-approves section
46.101(b)(4) exemptions on a daily basis, so as to include newly
"existing" data that have been added to the Sentinel System since the
prior day. This would be lawful but cumbersome.
The Common Rule also has a public benefit exemption, at sec-
tion 46.101 (b) (5), that is similar in spirit to HIPAA's public health
exception. Unfortunately, the two are not coextensive in terms of the
types of study they allow. The Common Rule allows unconsented use
of identifiable data in "research," but the permissible types of research
are directed more at studying and evaluating public benefit programs
themselves, rather than developing generalizable knowledge to fur-
ther the public health objectives of such programs. 228 Section 905
advanced drug safety research falls into that latter category. Advanced
drug safety studies are instrumental to FDA's public health practice,
but they are not a study of FDA's public health practice itself. The
Office for Protection from Research Risks (precursor of OHRP) pro-
vided guidance on application of this exemption. 229 It is a question of
interpretation whether section 905 advanced drug safety studies meet
the criteria provided in that guidance, but it appears that they would
not.
Again, these problems do not affect research use of coded data,
since unconsented use of coded data already is allowed under the
Common Rule without resorting to its section 46.101(b) exemp-
tions.230 These problems only affect release of identifiable data. The
Common Rule does, however, offer two additional pathways for
unconsented research with identifiable data. First, the Common
Rule's waiver and alteration provisions231 are very similar to those in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule. In any situation where HIPAA authorization
can be waived, it is highly likely that informed consent also can be
Vice Dean for Clinical Investigation, Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Med., et al., at 4
(July 17, 2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrmletrs/YRO7/julO7d.pdf.
228 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (b) (5).
229 See OPRR Guidance, supra note 159.
230 See OHRP 2004 Guidance, supra note 140, at 3-4.
231 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d). To grant a waiver under the Common Rule, an IRB
must determine that: (1) the research involves no more than minimal risk (including
privacy related risks); (2) waiver or alteration will not adversely affect rights and wel-
fare of subjects; (3) the research could not practicably be carried out without waiver
or alteration; and (4) where relevant, subjects will receive additional pertinent infor-
mation after participation. Id.
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waived. Second, if FDA adopts the Common Rule for the Sentinel
System, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(d) lets department or agency heads
exempt specific research activities or classes of activity from some or
all of the provisions of the Common Rule. This exemption could be
invoked for specific advanced drug safety studies that require identifi-
able data. Given the important privacy interests that are at stake when
identifiable data are released to outside parties, this requirement of
high-level agency approval arguably gives the decision the dignity it
deserves.
IV. THE COERCIVE NATURE OF DECISIONS ALLOWING ACCESS TO
SENTINEL SYSTEM DATA
FDA's decisions approving access to Sentinel System data by PIOs
and outside data users will have coercive effect on people whose data
are involved. Despite its long regulatory history, FDA has surprisingly
little experience making decisions that have mandatory effect on the
public. FDA's signature regulatory function-approving new prod-
ucts for sale-is enabling rather than coercive, both for the product
sponsor and for the public. No one is forced to take FDA-approved
drugs. In contrast, coercive governmental power is an essential char-
acteristic of public health law.23 2 The same is true of infrastructure
regulation; for example, FERC approval of a new pipeline forces some
people to have steel pipe in their back yards. Operating in relatively
uncontentious decisional terrain where its actions had only optional
public effect, FDA never had to develop the level of procedural safe-
guards expected when regulators flex coercive powers. Public trust in
the Sentinel System can exist only if FDA implements credible safe-
guards now. "If the government's unique and coercive powers are to
be used against members of society, then the public is understandably
anxious that coercion will be used fairly and only for important public
purposes. The well-warranted price of using coercion in a democracy
is usually elaborate procedural safeguards .... "233
It may be helpful, here, to explain the degree to which FDA tradi-
tionally has relied on voluntary acquiescence of the entities it regu-
lates, rather than coercive regulatory power. Denying a product
approval obviously has major impact on the product's sponsor, but
the decision is not coercive in the sense of interfering with vested
rights, since there is no right to have one's product approved. FDA's
232 See GoSTIN, supra note 146, at 5, 18-20.
233 GOMEZ-IBAN4EZ, supra note 32, at 19.
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authority to withdraw a previously-granted drug approval 234 comes
closer to being coercive, since the sponsor may have made large man-
ufacturing and marketing investments in reliance on the approval.
Here, as one might expect, FDA implements robust procedural safe-
guards: the sponsor receives prior notice and opportunity for a hear-
ing.235 An approval can be summarily suspended by the Secretary of
HHS if the drug poses an "imminent hazard," but even here the spon-
sor has an opportunity for an expedited hearing. 23 6 The Secretary
cannot delegate the authority to decide that a summary suspension is
warranted, although authority to conduct the expedited hearing is
delegated to FDA. 237 Decisions to withdraw an approval are subject to
judicial review.
238
In practice, FDA rarely has invoked its authority to withdraw
approvals, 23 9 instead tending to press manufacturers voluntarily to
stop selling injurious products, 241 which they often would do to limit
tort liability even absent any pressure from FDA. Except for infant
formulas24 1 and medical devices since 1990,242 FDA has no authority
to order product recalls and, again, relies heavily on voluntary recalls
by the manufacturer.243 Once a drug is approved, FDA imposes vari-
ous inspection, monitoring, and reporting requirements244 many of
which are only voluntary.245 The largely-voluntary reporting mecha-
nisms on which FDA was relying, prior to FDAAA, were estimated to
detect only one to ten percent of all adverse drug reactions. 246 Only
since passage of FDAAA in 2007 has FDA had the power to compel a
234 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006). A complete list of grounds for withdrawal is set
forth at 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2008).
235 21 U.S.C. § 355(e); 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(a).
236 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
237 Id.; see also Geoffrey M. Levitt et al., Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF LAW AND REGULATION 159, 178-79. (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1999).
238 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2006).
239 Levitt et al., supra note 237, at 178.
240 I. Scott Bass, Enforcement Powers of the Food and Drug Administration: Drugs and
Devices, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAw AND REGULATION, supra note 237, at 55, 70-74.
241 21 U.S.C. § 350a(e) (1) (2006).
242 Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 § 8, 21 U.S.C. § 360(h) (e) (2006).
243 Bass, supra note 240, at 70.
244 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80-.81 (2008).
245 See Wood et al., supra note 8, at 1851, 1853.
246 Frontline Interview with Paul Seligman (PBS television broadcast Nov. 4, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/prescrip-
tion/interviews/seligman.html (citing the one to ten percent figure for all adverse
events but noting that the system was estimated to detect between one-third to one-
half of all serious adverse events).
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change in product labeling247 or to condition the sale of a drug on
specific measures to mitigate safety risks. 248 Until then, these steps
required a willing manufacturer. FDAAA also broadened FDA's
authority to force manufacturers to conduct postmarket studies and
clinical trials. 249 Prior to FDAAA, the agency claimed it had such
authority250 but applied it very hesitantly. There was just one context
where FDA clearly did have statutory authority to require postmarket
studies251-to confirm the effectiveness of drugs approved under the
agency's accelerated approval program. 252 Even here, FDA relied on
voluntary compliance by manufacturers and notoriously failed to
require timely commencement or completion of the studies it
"required" manufacturers to conduct. 253 FDA has surprisingly little
experience wielding coercive power even with respect to manufactur-
ers of the products it regulates and certainly not with respect to the
public.
There is only one context where FDA previously has made deci-
sions with coercive effect on the public: waiver of informed consent
for certain kinds of clinical trials. FDA's section 50.24 waiver provi-
247 FDAAA § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o)(4) (West Supp. 2008) (letting FDA
notify manufacturers of safety information it believes should be included in drug
labeling). Following a period of response and discussions with the manufacturer,
FDA may order the safety information to be included. See id., 21 U.S.C.A.,
§ 355(o) (4) (B)-(D) (E).
248 See id. § 901(b), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (a) (1)-(2) (authorizing FDA to require
risk evaluation and mitigation strategies for newly and already approved drugs). FDA
may require such strategies to include conditions for marketing and sales, such as
restrictions on how, where, and by what type of professional the drug may be pre-
scribed or requirements that patients receive monitoring or testing to manage risks.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355-1 (f) (3) (West Supp. 2008); see also FDAAA § 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 352(y) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing drugs to be considered misbranded if manufac-
turers fail to comply with such restrictions).
249 See FDAAA § 901(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(o)(3) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing
FDA to require postmarket studies or clinical trials of drugs with known or suspected
safety problems); id. § 902(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(z) (allowing drugs to be regarded as
misbranded if manufacturer fails to conduct required postmarket studies).
250 FDA claimed the power to require postmarket studies was implicit in the
agency's power to enforce the FDCA and to require drug companies to provide data
bearing on whether previously granted approvals should be withdrawn. See 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 355(k); 371(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008), see also, Levitt et. al, supra note
237, at 179.
251 New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,236 (proposed Apr. 15, 1992); New Drug, Antibi-
otic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval, 57 Fed. Reg.
58,942, 58,953-54 (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pts 314 & 601).
252 21 C.F.R. § 314.540 (2008).
253 See Susan Okie, What Ails FDA ?, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1064 (2005).
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sions
2 5 4 are not at all like those of the Common Rule and HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule,25 5 which allow unconsented use of people's health data if
an IRB deems privacy risks to be minimal. FDA has never allowed
waivers of this type. However, FDA does let informed consent be
waived in clinical trials to test new products intended for use in
patients with serious, life-threatening medical emergencies.
256
Patients who would be candidates for testing these products typically
are so seriously ill-often, they are unconscious-that they cannot
give consent to be treated with an experimental product. Unless con-
sent is waived, such products could not be tested in human subjects
and their safety and efficacy would remain unknown. FDA allows IRBs
to waive consent for such trials if various conditions are met.257 For
example, there must be a prospect that the product may directly bene-
fit the particular patient.258 There also must be consultations with
representatives of the communities where the research will be carried
out 259 and public disclosure of plans to draw research subjects from
emergency patients in those communities.
260
Emergency consent waivers typically are approved by IRBs at the
institutions conducting the research. However, FDA ultimately
decides whether to allow clinical trials to go forward. 261 FDA's inter-
nal procedures require all trials involving a waiver of informed con-
sent to receive centralized review by FDA's own Division of Scientific
Investigations. 262 In this respect, FDA's waiver procedures are far
superior to those of the Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule. The
latter two rules let private, potentially conflicted decisionmakers-
IRBs and Privacy Boards-grant waivers with no centralized review,
before the research goes forward, by a publicly accountable govern-
mental body. IRBs and Privacy Boards are not subject even to the
most rudimentary procedural norms of regulatory decisionmaking,
254 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (2008).
255 See supra Parts III.B.1 & III.C.3.
256 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(1).
257 Id. § 50.24(a)(1)-(7).
258 Id. § 50.24(a) (3).
259 Id. § 50.24(a)(7)(i).
260 Id. § 50.24(a) (7) (ii).
261 If the experimental product is a drug, the drug's sponsor submits an Investiga-
tional New Drug (IND) application to FDA at least thirty days before the trial is set to
begin. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40 (2008). FDA has thirty days to object to the IND, after
which the IND becomes effective and the clinical trial may begin. If FDA is not satis-
fied with the proposed plan, FDA can impose a clinical hold that delays the trial until
FDA's concerns are satisfactorily addressed. Id. § 312.42.
262 See CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 111, § 6030.8, at
4-5.
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such as the Administrative Procedure Act's 263 requirements for rea-
soned, evidence-based decisionmaking; independent decisionmakers;
due process rights for affected parties; reviewable records; and rights
of appeal. 26 4 FDA correctly regards the approval of consent waivers to
be a coercive regulatory determination which should not be delegated
entirely to private organs of the entities FDA regulates.
That said, FDA's centralized review process for consent waivers
lacks the procedural formality and transparency that are needed to
merit public trust. FDA promulgated its emergency research waiver
provision in 1996265 and in the following decade received about sixty
requests to conduct clinical trials under waivers. 266 Inexperienced in
making coercive decisions, FDA drew heavily on lax procedural norms
that had characterized human-subject protections since the 1960s.
These norms grew out of informal Policies for the Protection of
Human Research Subjects first issued by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) in 1966.267 These informal policies were hastily incor-
porated in regulations promulgated on May 30, 1974 by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare 26 (predecessor of HHS) in
reaction to a well-publicized scandal with the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study. 269 Two months later, a National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was
established under the National Research Act of 1974.270 It met from
1974 to 1978 and was followed by the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research in the early 1980s. 2 71 The Common Rule rests on design
263 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
264 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); Carl H. Cole-
man, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research, 46 ARiz. L. REV. 1, 13-17
(2004); Barbara J. Evans, Inconsistent Regulatoiy Protection Under the U.S. Common Rule,
13 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 366, 372 (2004).
265 Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498, 51,498
(Oct. 2, 1996) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56, 312, 314, 601, 812, 814).
266 Conduct of Emergency Clinical Research; Public Hearing, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,143,
51,143 (Aug. 29, 2006).
267 See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK intro., pt. A (1993), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/irb/irbjintroduction.htm.
268 Id.
269 See generally JAMES H. JONEs, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
(2d ed. 1993) (detailing the history of the experiment and its consequences).
270 Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 201-205, 88 Stat. 342, 348-51 (expired May 18, 1979
pursuant to § 204 (e)).
271 See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., supra note 267, intro. pt. A.
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concepts from this era. 272 FDA's own human-subject protections,
273
first issued in 1981, were later harmonized with the Common Rule
and share many of its provisions.
274
Both regulations were originally designed for use in interven-
tional research-clinical trials where subjects are directly involved,
rather than studies involving only their tissues or data. As applied to
interventional research, the regulations afford two main protections:
(1) the assurance that someone other than the research investigator-
an IRB-will review the risks of research and make a discretionary
determination whether those risks comply with stated regulatory stan-
dards275 and (2) an opportunity for subjects to give their informed
consent prior to the research intervention. 276 A certain amount of
procedural laxity was tolerable in IRB decisionmaking precisely
because the vulnerable class-human research subjects-had the
right of informed consent. Research subjects were not actually forced
to rely on the IRB to protect them; ultimately, they could protect
themselves by refusing to participate in the research.
This same procedural laxity ceased to be acceptable when IRB
review was extended to other contexts, such as approving waivers for
research with health data and for emergency research. Here, there is
no opportunity for individual self-protection; IRB decisions do have
coercive effect. To rely on closed, informal procedures is equivalent
to letting insiders in a back room at the power company decide
whether consumers' rates satisfy the Federal Power Act's 'just and rea-
sonable" standard, or letting insiders of a pipeline company decide
that building a forty-eight-inch diameter pipeline through your back
yard serves the public convenience and necessity, without your having
272 See GIG, IRB A TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 201, at 3; see also ROBERT J.
LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 324 (2d ed., 1986).
273 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2008).
274 OIG, HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS, supra note 201, at 8.
275 Both the Common Rule and FDA regulations adopt an identical two-part stan-
dard: (1) risks should be minimized to the extent consistent with sound research, and
(2) risks should be reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to the
research subjects and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be
expected to result from the research. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a) (1)-(2) (2007) (Common
Rule); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a) (1)-(2) (2008) (FDA regulations).
276 See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTs ii, iv, xi (2001), http://www.bioethics.gov/
reports/past commissions/nbac-human-part.pdf (identifying the twin protections of
IRB review and informed consent); see also Coleman, supra note 264, at 7, 10 (citing
problems with the sufficiency of informed consent as a protective mechanism, and
arguing that insufficiency of consent creates a need for more robust procedures for
IRB decisionmaking).
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an opportunity to participate and comment. The FERC reviews appli-
cations for certificates of public convenience and necessity in formal
proceedings, noticed and open to the public and offering due process
protections to all affected groups.277 Consent waivers warrant a level
of procedural formality more like that of a FERC section 7 (c) certifica-
tion proceeding than a traditional IRB meeting. Instead, the waiver
provisions of the Common Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and FDA
regulations all failed to incorporate the enhanced procedural protec-
tions that coercive decisions require. FDA partially addressed this
problem by requiring centralized, prior review of research involving
waivers. 278 However, FDA procedures afford less than a full set of due
process protections.279
Quite predictably, FDA's emergency-research waiver provisions
generated controversy, culminating in a 2006 scandal over clinical tri-
als of a blood substitute, PolyHeme, intended for use in injury victims
who had lost substantial quantities of blood.280 Since the product
could be stored in ambulances and was compatible with all blood
types, it offered promise as a way to keep accident victims alive in field
settings where regular blood transfusions were unavailable. The
clinical trials took place in thirty-two communities in eighteen
states. 28' People injured and unconscious in those communities were
at risk to receive PolyHeme unless they wore, at all times, a blue brace-
277 See 18 C.F.R. § 157.5-21 (2008).
278 See CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 111, § 6030.8, at
4-5.
279 See id. FDA's review of clinical trials involving an exception from informed
consent under 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 includes review by FDA's Division of Scientific Inves-
tigation (DSI) of the IRB's plans for community consultation and public disclosure
within the communities where the research will be carried out. Id. at 5. However,
FDA has never enunciated a clear standard regarding what forms of community con-
sultation will be considered adequate, nor does decisionmaking follow basic norms of
notice, transparency of decisions, and opportunities for the public to appeal before
research goes forward.
280 For critiques of the PolyHeme trial, see Letter from Senator Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin., to Michael Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
press/Gpress/2005/prg031306.pdf; see also Karla F.C. Holloway, Accidental Communi-
ties: Race, Emergency Medicine, and the Problem of PolyHeme, AM. J. BIOETHICS, May 2006, at
7, 12-16 (citing the trial as an example of systematic racial bias in prehospital emer-
gency medical care); Ken Kipnis et al., An Open Letter to Institutional Review Boards
Considering Northfield Laboratories'PolyHeme Trial AM. J. BIOETHICS, May 2006, at 18, 18
(claiming that "there is a serious ethical flaw" in the trial).
281 Letter from Senator Grassley, supra note 280, at 2.
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let stating, "I decline the Northfield PolyHeme® Study. '282 Use of
PolyHeme would continue not only in transit to the hospital but for
several hours afterward, when standard blood transfusions would have
been available. Earlier trials of another blood substitute product had
caused serious injuries among some patients who received it.28 FDA's
required community consultation process allegedly failed to supply
adequate information to the affected public and many people were
unaware a study was taking place. 284 Even those who were aware
objected to the notion that they should be burdened with wearing a
bracelet to avoid unconsented treatment with a potentially dangerous
product.
285
In retrospect, the PolyHeme trial did not cause widespread inju-
ries, 286 but it drew attention to the coercive nature of consent waivers.
FDA held public hearings shortly after the scandal in 2006.287 Com-
ments filed by members of the public, though not a scientific sample,
suggest a lack of public trust. Asked whether the criteria for approv-
ing studies under the section 50.24 waiver provisions were adequate,
comments ranged from, "No they are not adequate. There will always
be somebody to push the limits for 'THE GOOD OF SOCIETY"' 288 to
"This really scares me and gives me visions of Mengele and the
282 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Questions FDA's Sanction
of Blood Substitute Study Without Informed Consent 2 (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Gpress/2005/prgO22306a.pdf.
283 See Charles Natanson et al., Cell-Free Hemoglobin-Based Blood Substitutes and Risk of
Myocardial Infarction and Death, 299 JAMA 2304, 2307 tbl.2 (2008) (discussing risks of
PolyHeme and four other blood substitutes); id. at 2310 (pointing out that FDA let
PolyHeme trials go forward despite adverse events in previous trials of other blood
substitutes).
284 See Letter from Senator Grassley, supra note 280, at 2.
285 See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., supra note 282, at 1.
286 See Natanson et al., supra note 283 at 2307, 2310 (indicating some increase in
the relative risk of mortality and serious adverse events, although noting questions
about the statistical significance of these increased risks).
287 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Public
Hearing on Emergency Research and Human Subject Protections (Oct. 11, 2006)
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/06dO331/06d-0331-trOOOOl-vo14.rtf see
also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Health & Human Servs., 2006D-0331: Guidance
for Institutional Review Boards, Clinical Investigators, and Sponsors, Exception from
Informed Consent Requirements for Emergency Research (Jan. 31, 2007), http://
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/06d0331/1.htm (cataloguing documents rele-
vant to the hearings including comments from consumers and other concerned
parties).
288 Sandra Sells, FDA Comment No. EC30 (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dockets/06d0331/06D-0331-EC30.htm.
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Nazis." 289 Public distrust was a perfectly predictable consequence of
applying informal procedural norms, developed for use in nonmanda-
tory decisionmaking, to a new context where decisions have coercive
effect.
Section 50.24 emergency consent waivers affect, at most, a few
hundred people per year. The public, as a whole, may not feel
threatened by emergency-research waivers. People risk becoming
involved in emergency research only if they get into a serious medical
emergency; none of us ever thinks that will happen to us. The Senti-
nel System is a different story. It involves 100 million people, who
need only visit a doctor's office, fill a prescription, or file an insurance
claim to risk being placed in the Sentinel database. This risk is palpa-
ble to all members of the public, who have no means to self-protect
and are entirely reliant on FDA's decisional processes to protect their
rights.
V. LESSONS FROM OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE REGULATORY CONTEXTS
Framing Sentinel System privacy as a bioethical problem may not
be the best way to achieve solutions that will earn public trust. The
field of bioethics offers no good answer to the question, "What is a
proper framework for coercive decisionmaking?" Contemporary
bioethics starts from the premise that autonomous individuals ought
not be coerced. 290 When coercion does become necessary, as in vari-
289 Lillian Kehoe, FDA Comment No. ECiu (Sept. il, 2006) http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dockets/06d0331/06D-0331-EC11 .htm.
290 The field of bioethics, as it developed in the 1950s and 1960s, drew heavily on a
Kantian, atomistic concept of autonomy that conceives individuals as self-reliant, self-
governing, and individualistic. See ALFRED I. TAUBER, PATIENT AUTONOMY AND THE
ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY 13 (2005). The concept is similar to Fallon's "ascriptive"
autonomy, which entails each person's sovereignty over his or her moral choices.
Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 890-93 (1994). At
the birth of bioethics, the field was principally concerned with the rights of patients as
against physicians in a paternalistic healthcare system; strong assertions of individual
autonomy were an antidote to imbalances of power in that relationship. See TAUBER,
supra at 15-16; see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 258 (1991)
("Patients are also likely to be sparing with the deference and trust they accord to
physicians .... reserving for themselves critical decisions about treatment."). Balanc-
ing individual rights against broader public interests has not been a major focus of
bioethical thought. The notion, "Individuals are free to enjoy their rights, so long as
they do not encroach on the rights of others," embodies an atomistic concept of
autonomy, as Tauber has noted. Tauber, supra at 119 (citing GRACE CLEMENT, CARE,
AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE (1996)). Yet the atomistic concept of autonomy poses a
problem: it offers no account of why and when the moral sovereignty of the individual
should yield to public interests. It leaves policymakers with Aleinikoffs "external-
scale" problem-the search for an external, objective set of values by which to balance
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ous public health and other regulatory contexts, bioethics may have
little to offer beyond, "Coercion is wrong." That is not the question
here. In passing FDAAA, Congress made a determination that coer-
cion is necessary to reduce the carnage of drug-related injuries;
291
respect for autonomy does not require us to let individuals control the
secrecy of their medical records at a cost of injuries and death to
others. The question now is how to promote legitimacy and public
acceptability of decisions to use and disclose Sentinel System data.
The available options, at this point, are either to press Congress for
repeal of FDAAA, or else to focus on creating robust institutional pro-
tections for individuals within what is, unabashedly, a coercive regula-
tory framework. Framing the question as, "What institutional
protections are appropriate?" lets policy be informed by norms of
coercive decisionmaking in other regulatory contexts. The objective
of this Article was to pose this question, rather than to answer it, but
below I present a few thoughts about directions in which answers may
lie.
A. Industry Structure
FDA must weigh the appropriate structure for the industry that
supplies LPHD to the Sentinel System. This is crucial not as a matter
of economic regulation, but because industry structure affects privacy.
Certain critical functions-in particular, the longitudinal linkage of
patients' health data-require access to identifiable information;
other functions do not. Privacy may best be protected by eschewing
vertical integration, segregating key functions that use identifiable
health information as inputs, and sharply restricting the number of
PIOs licensed to perform those key functions. Having fewer PIOs
competing interests. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Bal-
ancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 962-63, 975 (1987). The atomistic concept of autonomy,
embraced by 1960s-era bioethicists, has no internal scale. Only more recently, after
1980, have bioethicists begun to explore alternatives, such as a view of autonomy as
"not merely an internal, or psychological characteristic but also an external, or social
one," with individuals achieving autonomy in cooperation rather than in isolation.
See TAUBER, supra at 120-22 (quoting CLEMENT, supra, at 22). This latter view eventu-
ally may allow bioethicists to wield questions that require balancing of individual and
societal interests. However, such inquiries remain poorly developed in the field of
bioethics at this time.
291 See, e.g., J. Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized
Patients, 279JAMA 1200, 1200 (1998) (estimating that 0.32% of prescriptions written
kill the patient, placing adverse drug reactions between the fourth and sixth leading
causes of death at U.S. hospitals; another 6.7% of prescriptions result in injuries seri-
ous enough to put the patient in the hospital or prolong the stays of already hospital-
ized patients).
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means fewer employees handling patients' sensitive health data and,
therefore, fewer chances for inadvertent or malicious disclosure.
Reducing the number of PIOs also facilitates meaningful auditing and
enforcement, which often have been lacking in other privacy and
human-subject protection contexts where regulators are spread too
thinly.2 9 2 However, structural alternatives must be weighed in light of
second-order problems each may cause. For example, granting
monopolies in key infrastructure functions may require further regu-
lation to manage bottlenecks, ensure reliability of service, and prevent
abuses of monopoly power.
B. Contracts vs. Rules to Set Regulatory Standards
FDA faces a major decision on how to enunciate standards, terms,
and conditions to govern PIOs and data users. One alternative is con-
tract-based regulation, which sets standards via contracts negotiated
with the respective PIOs and data users. The major alternative is to set
generally applicable standards through rulemaking (rule-based regu-
lation). Rule-based regulation was part of the original paradigm of
American infrastructure regulation. It sometimes is called "discretion-
ary" regulation, 293 since the regulator exercises discretion in interpret-
ing the rules and applying them to specific fact situations. However, I
prefer the term "rule-based regulation" in the U.S. setting, where con-
tract-based regulation typically is implemented by appointing a regula-
tory agency to represent the government in contract negotiations.
294
When this is true-as in the Sentinel System-contract-based regula-
tion still involves regulatory discretion, when the regulator decides
whether to accept or reject various contract terms. The choice
between contract- and rule-based regulation is merely a choice of how
the regulator's discretion will be exercised.
The Sentinel System raises two separate questions: (1) whether
standards should be set via individually negotiated contracts, via gen-
erally applicable rules, or through a combination of both approaches;
and (2) whether FDA should retain centralized control over key dis-
cretionary decisions (such as deciding whether a given data use fits
within the scope of section 905), or delegate at least some discretion
292 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., GOMEZ-IBAN EZ, supra note 32, at 12-13, 30-32; Chen, supra note 33, at
1628.
294 See Guislain & Kerf, supra note 125, at 1, 3-4. When contract-based regulation
is implemented in foreign settings, it sometimes involves direct negotiation of regula-
tory contracts between the private infrastructure operator and the government, with-
out necessarily creating a special-purpose industry regulatory agency to oversee
negotiation and ongoing oversight of the contract.
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for PIOs and data users to interpret standards own their own. As to
this first question, FDAAA does not constrain FDA's choice. Section
905 expressly authorizes FDA to negotiate contracts with PIOs and
data users. 295 However, section 905 amends a preexisting statute, the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which already imbues FDA
with broad general rulemaking and adjudicative authority.296 Thus,
FDA is free to use either approach or a mix of the two. There is exten-
sive literature and experience bearing on the advantages and disad-
vantages of contract- and rule-based regulation.
2 97
The most serious problem with contract-based regulation is con-
tractual incompleteness 2 9 8-that is, the impossibility of foreseeing and
providing for every future contingency at the time contracts are being
negotiated. Particularly in new infrastructure industries, it is difficult
to anticipate changes in the multiparty relationship among PIOs, the
regulator, users of infrastructure services, and the general public.29 9
Rule-based regulation allows flexibility to set broad, open-textured
standards and rely on later interpretations by the regulator to fill gaps
and adapt standards to changing circumstances. 30 0
Other potential problems with contract-based regulation are
inconsistency and problems with transparency. Different PIOs may be
subject to different contract terms, and it may be difficult for the pub-
lic to ascertain what the standards are, when standards are dispersed
in multiple, separate contracts. Even if FDA chooses to rely on con-
tracts to set some of the business and financial terms governing PIOs,
public trust will be enhanced by using generally-applicable rules to
establish core privacy protections. Chen has noted the risk of collu-
sion between governmental bodies and PIOs, particularly at the point
when contracts come due for renegotiation; this collusion can sell out
the interests of the people.30 1 Contract negotiations are, in this
respect, riskier than rule-based regulation in that they involve the
exercise of discretion but without the procedural and other safe-
guards that typically are built into a rule-based scheme.
3 0 2
295 FDAAA § 905(a), 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(k) (3) (C) (v), (k) (4) (F) (West Supp. 2008).
296 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
297 See, e.g., G6MEZ-IBA&EZ, supra note 32, at 28, tbl.2.1 (comparing the two
approaches).
298 See Chen, supra note 33, at 1628 (citing Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRIcs 755 (1988)).
299 See id. (citing G6MEZ-IBA_ EZ, supra note 32, at 11-12, 27-30).
300 See id.
301 See id. at 1649.
302 Id. at 1649-50.
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FDA should not be enslaved by the modern trend toward con-
tract-based regulation. This trend reflects, in part, widespread use of
contract-based regulation in foreign settings. 30 3 There, private inves-
tors often distrust rule-based regulation, fearing that the government
will opportunistically change the rules after investments are made or
fearing that judicial oversight of regulators will be weak.30 4 Contract-
and rule-based systems both have good, stable track records in the
United States, so FDA should be able to attract private investors under
either approach, provided the underlying regulatory standards are
well conceived. The modern critique of rule-based regulation in the
United States has tended to center on the fact that it can be cumber-
some and inefficient.3 0 5 However, this critique arose late in the twen-
tieth century, when the challenge was to optimize use of already-built
infrastructures, rather than to get new infrastructures built.3 0 6 Chen
notes that rule-based regulation actually may be the more efficient
alternative under the economic conditions that prevailed earlier in
the twentieth century,30 7 that is, when major new infrastructures were
being built. When FDA is overseeing new infrastructure development,
rule-based regulation may be the best way to address uncertainties and
problems with contractual incompleteness. Even proponents of con-
tract-based regulation, such as G6mez-Ibdfiez, acknowledge that rule-
based regulation has enjoyed practical success in such contexts.
30 8
A perceived disadvantage of rule-based regulation is that it entails
burdensome regulatory procedures to constrain the regulator's ongo-
ing exercise of discretion.3 0 9 However, this should not be a decisive
factor in the choice between contract- and rule-based regulation for
the Sentinel System, since elaborate procedural protection of the pub-
lic interest will be needed, either way. Contract-based regulation has
been widely and successfully used in industries, like energy and tele-
communications, where the public interest standard is directed
toward protecting the public from economic harms. It is relatively
straightforward to set rates or rate formulas via contract terms. How-
303 See generally Shirley, supra note 125 (surveying the effectiveness of contract-
based regulation in 565 infrastructure privatizations).
304 G6MEZ-IBAVJEZ, supra note 32, at 15; Chen, supra note 33, at 1620-21; Smith &
Wellenius, supra note 93, at 2-3.
305 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 33, at 1631 (noting the public utility regulation has
been criticized as raising questions of "indeterminacy and inefficiency").
306 Cf id. at 1620-21 (discussing the changes in infrastructure priorities from the
nineteenth to twentieth centuries).
307 Id. at 1633, 1650.
308 GOMEZ-IBA&EZ, supra note 32, at 353-56; see also Chen, supra note 33, at
1631-33.
309 Chen, supa note 33, at 1669.
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ever, the Sentinel System's public-interest standard involves subtle
judgments about the scientific value of proposed data uses and the
acceptability of various degrees of privacy risk. These standards will
be difficult to reduce to explicit contract language, and rule-based
regulation very well may emerge as the superior alternative.
C. Degree of Centralization of Discretionary Decisions
This Article already has taken the position that certain key deci-
sions-particularly those involving release of identifiable data-must
remain under centralized FDA control. 1° The concern was that
decentralized decisionmaking could erode public trust due to its reli-
ance on conflicted decisionmakers (local IRBs and Privacy Boards).
Whether to decentralize decisionmaking is not just a matter of con-
flicts of interest, however. This choice also can affect the quality of
regulatory decisions. Decentralization may be the better option, when
decisions turn on information that is more readily available in the
local context. Centralization is generally better when decisions
require comparisons among multiple alternatives that may not all be
visible to local decisionmakers.
The core concept of section 905's public-interest standard is that
coercive disclosure of people's private health information is warranted
only when the proposed data use offers significant public health bene-
fits. Implementing this standard implies comparing the relative merits
of various proposed uses of data, so that the public is not exposed to
privacy risks for marginally beneficial studies.3 1' Thus, decisions
about permissible data uses and ancillary sales of Sentinel System data
should not be decentralized to PIOs. Each P1O's perspective is lim-
ited to the discrete set of proposed uses that happen to come before
it. Individual PIOs are not in a position to rank proposals on the
national scale that is required, to ensure people's privacy is jeopard-
ized only for the highest-valued uses. It may be possible, however, for
FDA to specify certain categories of data use that unquestionably do
have high priority. PIOs might be granted limited discretion to allow
sales that fit clearly within those categories. However, defining the
permissible categories is a high-level task requiring centralized coordi-
nation-and therefore one that should be done by FDA.
310 See supra Part III.B.2.
311 See supra Part I.A.
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D. Ensuring Independence and Legitimacy of Regulatory Decisionmaking
and Adequate Resources for Credible Regulatory Oversight
Independence is fundamental to the legitimacy of a regulator's
decisions. Smith defines independence in terms of three elements:
(1) "[a]n arm's-length relationship with regulated firms, consumers,
and other private interests"; (2) "[a] n arm's-length relationship with
political authorities;" and (3) "[t]he attributes of organizational
autonomy"-such as adequate, stable funding to support regulatory
activities-"to foster the requisite expertise to underpin those arm's-
length relationships." 1 2
IRBs and Privacy Boards make heavy use of voluntary staffing by
insiders of the institutions being regulated and, having no indepen-
dent source of funding, usually depend on the regulated institutions
for their operating budgets. Lacking independence, they lack legiti-
macy in contexts that require them to make coercive decisions.313
The Sentinel System will not merit public trust if FDA delegates deci-
sionmaking to IRBs and Privacy Boards of the PiOs and data users. 3
14
Even centralizing decisions in FDA's own IRB or Privacy Board will
not ensure their legitimacy, unless these bodies have the attributes of
independence. 315 As already noted, FDA is conflicted by its dual roles
as a consumer of Sentinel System data and privacy regulator. For
many years, FDA enjoyed a reputation as one of the most trusted regu-
latory agencies in the United States.316 However, in 2006, the Institute
312 Smith, supra note 91, at 1.
313 An arm's length relationship between regulatory decisionmakers and regu-
lated companies is so basic that its absence gives rise to the presumption that a legiti-
mate regulatory framework is not in place. See, e.g., Robert Bacon, A Scorecard for
Energy Reform in Developing Countries, PUB. POL'Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Apr. 1999, at
2 box 1, available at http://rru.worldbank.org.documents/publicpolicyjournal/175
bacon.pdf (surveying 115 developing countries to ascertain whether they had or had
not instituted effective regulatory frameworks based on six criteria-such as whether
the nations had passed regulatory laws and whether they had completed various
restructuring and privatization steps within the regulated industries-and applying a
single criterion to judge whether appropriate regulatory decisionmaking bodies were
in place: was there a regulator that was separate from the regulated companies and
from political authorities?).
314 Cf Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally
Funded Research Data, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 369, 370 (2000) ("Transparency and
accountability in government are two principles crucial to securing public trust.").
315 See Smith, supra note 91, at 1.
316 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., FDA Protects
the Public Health; Ranks High in Public Trust (Feb. 2002), http://www.fda.gov/
opacom/factsheets/justthefacts/lfda.pdf (reporting results of an independent sur-
vey, conducted in 1999, which found high levels of public trust in FDA).
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of Medicine found the agency's credibility seriously tarnished by a
perceived lack of transparency and public accountability, failure to
follow through with proposed initiatives, and slowness requiring com-
pliance by its regulated entities. 317 The public is unlikely to trust FDA
to protect Sentinel System privacy unless the agency scrupulously
adheres to norms of regulatory independence and legitimacy.
One option is to segregate functions within FDA, so that oversight
of privacy is separate from the divisions within FDA that are users of
Sentinel System data. This approach may or may not be credible to
the public. Privacy and ethical oversight divisions within HHS agen-
cies have, historically, been underfunded, lightly staffed, and relatively
disempowered within the agencies of which they are components.3 18
OHRP, which administers the Common Rule, has only thirty-four per-
sonne1319 to oversee decisions by 3,000 to 5,000 IRBs and a nationwide
portfolio of NIH-funded research valued at $28 billion annually,
eighty-three percent of which is awarded via 50,000 grants to over
3,000 remote universities, medical schools, and research institu-
tions.320 At this staffing level, auditing, enforcement, and oversight
are necessarily light.321 HHS' Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which
administers the HIPAA Privacy Rule under similar constraints, did not
impose a single civil fine and prosecuted only two criminal cases in its
first three years of operation.3 22 For comparison, the FERC has 1295
personnel323 and the FCC has 1814 324-levels more in line with a
credible oversight effort. An independent privacy-protection body,
317 COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS., supra note 13, at
17-18.
318 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL TRIALS, 10-18 (2007),
available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-06-00160.pdf (discussing fac-
tors, including resource and data constraints, that undercut FDA's ethical oversight of
clinical trials).
319 Office for Human Research Prots., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Staff
Directory, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/staff.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
320 Nat'l Inst. of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., NIH Overview,
http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
321 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
322 Ron Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at Al.
323 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.ferc.gov/ol 2faqpro/default.asp?Action=Q&ID=17 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2008) (reporting a full year 2006 budget of $220 million and 1295 employees).
324 Office of Managing Dir., Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 2007 Annual FCC
Employee Survey Responses 2, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/
DOC-280549Al.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (reporting 1814 employees as of
November 2007).
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whether within or outside FDA, can earn credibility only if it is ade-
quately funded and staffed.
If FDA follows the model of OHRP and OCR and assigns a hand-
ful of people to oversee the privacy of 100 million Americans, the pub-
lic righdy will perceive that privacy is being taken lightly. On the
other hand, huge regulatory staffs do not guarantee meaningful pro-
tection, and the public is reluctant to bear their costs. Smart regula-
tion, rather than big regulation, may be the right approach. An
example of smart regulation is HHS's reliance on qui tam3 2 5 actions as
a means of detecting and policing Medicare fraud.3 26 An enormous
staff of regulatory auditors would be required to detect fraud in the
complex healthcare setting. HHS leverages the efforts of its own audi-
tors by empowering employees of healthcare institutions and other
industry insiders, who ultimately are in the best position to detect
fraud when it is occurring, to initiate qui tam actions against entities
suspected of violating the Civil False Claims Act.3 27 HHS may elect to
join such actions and carry them forward, but the person originating
the suit is allowed to share in the sums recovered.3 28 FDA might
devise similar incentives to encourage insiders of PiOs and data users
to keep their eyes open and report privacy violations, thus leveraging
the efforts of its own oversight personnel.
"To be autonomous, regulatory agencies must first have their own
resources-from their own funding resources."3 29 FDA as a whole has
been under severe budgetary pressure in recent years.330 It seems
implausible that the agency will divert resources from its already-
325 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(d) (2006).
326 See Dan McGuire & Mac Schneider, Health Care Fraud, 44 AM. CrmM. L. REV.
633, 389 (2007) ("Qui tam actions are a growing method of healthcare fraud enforce-
ment. In 1993 there were 132 qui tam actions and by 2003 this number had jumped
to approximately 3260.").
327 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
328 See id. § 3730(d).
329 Antonio Estache, Designing Regulatory Institutions for Infrastructure-Lessons from
Argentina, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, May 1997, at 1, available at http://
rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/114estac.pdf.
330 See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the
Strongest Case, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 476 (1997) ("FDA is woefully underfunded
for its mandate, which includes regulatory oversight of products that account for
more than twenty-five percent of all American consumer purchases . . . . 'It is glar-
ingly apparent that FDA cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within
the limitations of existing resources.'" (quoting ADVISORY COMM. ON FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., FINAL REPORT 11 (1991))); Alicia Mundy, Congress Presses FDA on Budget Woes,
Investigative Arm, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2008, at A19 ("Members of Congress are ques-
tioning the management and priorities of [FDA's criminal investigation wing], in the
context of FDA budget problems.").
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underfunded core functions to ensure robust oversight of Sentinel
System privacy. During the past fifteen years, the problem of funding
regulatory agencies has been a focus of attention both in developed
and developing nations. 331 The challenge is to harness private sector
funds to reduce reliance on governmental appropriations to support
regulatory oversight, without undermining the regulator's
independence.
332
One widely used approach is user fees, in which regulated entities
pay fees for specific oversight services that the regulator provides.
333
FDA relies heavily on user fees to fund its drug and device approval
processes.334 User fees generate problems-real and perceived-with
the regulator's independence, in situations where the regulator's
underlying duty is to protect the public rather than the commercial
entities that are paying its fees. For this reason, FDA should avoid
funding its privacy-protection functions with user fees paid by PIOs,
data users, and others whose interests may be adverse to those of the
public. A better approach, from the standpoint of preserving inde-
pendence, is used by some U.S. infrastructure regulatory agencies.
This approach levies small fees that are spread broadly among mem-
bers of the protected class, for example, the people who consume
goods and services that the regulated industry supplies. The FERC is
funded, in part, by a small surcharge amounting to a couple of cents
added to the price of every thousand cubic feet of natural gas that is
transported through an interstate pipeline.335 The charge is collected
and remitted to the FERC by pipelines, which include it in their rates,
331 Katja Sander Johannsen et al., Dimensions of Regulatory Independence-A
Comparative Study of the Nordic Electricity Regulators 6 (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.elforsk-marketdesign.net/archives/2003/conference/
papers/13_pedersen-larsen.pdf (comparing regulatory funding in Nordic countries);
Kathleen Riviere-Smith, Funding the Regulator 4-7 (Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.
oocur.org/Proceedings/Presentations/RiviereSmithl.pdf (detailing regulatory fund-
ing in the Bahamas).
332 See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
333 See generally Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in FDA's New Drug
Approval Process: The Prescription Drug Use Fee Act of 1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 483
(1992) (discussing FDA's use of user fees).
334 See David A. Kessler & David V. Vladeck, A Critical Examination ofFDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 485-86 (2008).
335 See 18 C.F.R. § 382.101, .202 (2008) (establishing procedures for "calculating
and asserting annual charges to reimburse the United States for... costs incurred by
[the FERC]," specifically the costs of the administration of natural gas regulation,
"assessed against each natural gas pipeline company" in accordance with the propor-
tion of regulated gas it transported).
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but ultimately is paid by gas consumers. 33 6 The regulator is not
beholden to the industry, but to the consumers whose interests it pro-
tects. Moreover, the regulator is not captive to any particular constitu-
ency since diverse stakeholders (for example, industrial and
residential consumers) all contribute to its support, and fees are not
tied to particular matters that the regulator is asked to resolve.
By analogy, Sentinel System privacy oversight could be funded by
charging patients a few cents on any healthcare transaction that gen-
erates health records or insurance claims. These fees could be gath-
ered by healthcare providers and insurers for remittance to FDA. The
costs of privacy oversight would be paid by the protected class,
patients. Privacy regulators' budgets would not be dependent on the
PIOs and data users they are regulating. Some scholars may object
that privacy is a right, and the public should not have to pay for pri-
vacy protection. However, the alternatives are for privacy protection
to go unfunded, to be funded by entities with adverse commercial
interests, or to be funded at inadequate levels through governmental
appropriations. Given these alternatives, paying a small fee for mean-
ingful privacy protection may make sense to members of the public.
Experience in other industries suggests the public is quite willing to
pay for privacy-for example, many airline passengers voluntarily pay
a fifteen dollar booking fee to telephone their credit card numbers
directly to airline ticketing agents, rather than sending this sensitive
information over the Internet. 33
7
E. Appropriate Risk Sharing to Support System Financing and Privacy
Financial constraints pose the greatest single threat to Sentinel
System privacy. FDA will come under pressure to allow wider data
sales to help defray costs of system development. Governmental
appropriations are unlikely to be adequate to pay for the system
entirely. The financing plan will depend, in part, on revenues from
other data users. PIOs face risks in making large, up-front, asset-spe-
cific investments, 338 because their ability to make future data sales is
336 See id. § 154.402 ("[A] natural gas pipeline company may adjust its rates, annu-
ally, to recover from its customers annual charges assessed by the Commission under
part 382 of this chapter.").
337 A fifteen dollar fee may in fact be conservative for today's travel industry, as,
for instance, Delta and United Airlines both now charge a twenty-five dollar fee for
reservations made by phone. Delta Airlines Official Website, http://delta.com (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008); United Airlines Official Website, http://united.com (last vis-
ited Nov. 14, 2008).
338 Chen, supra note 33, at 1624 (defining asset specificity as "the relative difficulty
of transferring assets intended for use in one transaction to other uses").
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uncertain. To get the Sentinel System built, FDA must resolve these
risks just enough to let private investment go forward, without aban-
doning the agency's duty to protect people's privacy. This is a classic
infrastructure financing problem and FDA should draw on lessons
other infrastructure regulators have learned when solving similar
problems in other industries.
FDA has two basic tools for reducing the risks private investors
face. One tool is money and the other is privacy policy. FDA could
agree to pay a price in its future purchases of LPHD for FDA's own
use that is high enough to repay the investments PIOs will be making
to develop infrastructure for supplying the LPHD. Then, no ancillary
data sales would be needed, and FDA could adopt a privacy policy that
forbids them. The problem with this approach is that FDA does not
have that much money;339 Congress has not given FDA enough money
to "buy" privacy outright. At the other extreme, FDA could adopt a
permissive privacy policy that lets PIOs make any ancillary data sale
they want to make. This obviously would breach FDA's duty to protect
individual privacy.
3 40
To resolve this dilemma, FDA needs to deploy its available funds
skillfully. "Skillful" means exploring options other than direct public
financing of the Sentinel System infrastructure. Payments for FDA's
purchases of LPHD are a form of direct public financing. If FDA
relies solely on this mechanism, the money will run out, and the sys-
tem still will not be built. At that point, FDA will face enormous pres-
sure to adopt a lax privacy policy to ensure completion of the system.
To avoid this outcome, FDA must deploy funds in ways that achieve
what inarticulately is called "additionality"-in other words, each dol-
lar FDA puts forward should unlock additional funds from other, pri-
vate financing mechanisms. FDA needs to develop a multifaceted
Sentinel System infrastructure financing facility, 341 which might, for
example, include loan guarantees to ensure PIOs will repay private
borrowing, or risk guarantees to address specific uncertainties that
339 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of Congress'
appropriations for the Sentinel System).
340 See supra Part I.B (discussing FDA's duty to protect the privacy of individuals in
the Sentinel System).
341 Anand Chandavarkar, Infrastructure Finance: Issues, Institutions, and Policies (The
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1374, 1994), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/tW3P/IB/ 1994/11/01/0
00009265_3970716141904/Rendered/PDF/multipage.pdf (analyzing the distinctive
features of infrastructure financing and the principle issues for policymakers to
address); see also Klingebiel & Ruster, supra note 53 (presenting case studies of infra-
structure financing facilities at various stages of development).
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threaten to block private financing. Direct contractual obligations for
FDA to pay for Sentinel System LPHD may be part of the financing
facility, but they only should be one part of it.
A related question is whether revenues from approved outside
data uses and ancillary sales should flow entirely to the PIO, or
whether a portion of these revenues should be harnessed to help fund
system development and cross-subsidize FDA's own public health uses
of Sentinel System data. FDA may wish to explore tariffication strate-
gies that identify several different classes of users and grant them
access on different terms and conditions, including graduated fees for
access to Sentinel System data. This strategy would be similar to the
approach long used by American public utilities, in which a published
tariff defines several groups of similarly situated customers (for exam-
ple, industrial electricity consumers, small commercial users, and
households) and sets pricing, terms, and conditions of service for
each group. 342 Different groups pay different prices, but the similarly
situated customers within each group are treated alike.34 3 By analogy,
researchers conducting the highest-priority drug safety studies might
receive free access to Sentinel System data, subject to their agreement
to make results available for FDA to share with physicians and
patients. Academic researchers who agree to place their research
findings in the public domain might be charged a lower fee than com-
mercial users who desire to patent their discoveries. User groups that
are deemed to pose the greatest threats to privacy could be charged
higher fees that help defray the cost of extra regulatory oversight,
compliance monitoring, and enforcement activities that will be
required to reassure the public that these data users are not compro-
mising individual privacy.
Designing infrastructure financing facilities is a highly developed
art that has been extensively plied since 1990 in developing econo-
mies where public funds are scarce and private investors are hard to
recruit.344 FDA should not reinvent the wheel. It should draw on the
vast expertise resident at agencies such as the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the Organiza-
342 See PHILLIPS, supra note 37, at 438-41 (discussing permissible discrimination
among user classes in utility rate design); William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan,
Financing Solar Energy Development Through Public Utilities, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 371,
407 (1982).
343 See Lawrence & Minan, supra note 342, at 407.
344 See generally INFRASTRUCTuRE NETWORK, THE WORLD BANK, INFRASTRUCTURE:
LESSONS FROM THE LAST Two DECADES OF WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT (2006) (discuss-
ing efforts to design infrastructure financing in various countries since the late
1980s).
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tion for International Cooperation and Development (the World
Bank). A key question will be, "Which risks should FDA bear, and
which should be borne by the PICs?" Sentinel System risks are partly
commercial and partly political. Commercial risks include uncertain
demand for the new infrastructure services, construction delays and
cost overruns, unexpected operating and maintenance expenses,
changes in availability and cost of inputs and outputs, and contractor
insolvency.3 45 Political risks arise when governmental policies inter-
fere with private investors' plans.3 46 Political risks could arise if FDA
failed to provide clear, stable rules and policies on which PICs can
depend; if FDA reneged on its commitments to PIs; if FDA
neglected privacy issues, risking a public backlash that could shut the
system down or severely limit its use; or if key laws and regulations
such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule changed in ways that undercut inves-
tors' original business assumptions.
A basic rule of infrastructure financing is that commercial risks
are best borne by private investors. 347 Governments should not use
their limited funds to absolve private investors of commercial risk.348
For example, a major commercial risk is the uncertain market for
LPHD. Sentinel System LPHD is a new product and nobody really
knows how many users actually would want to purchase it if it were
available. A key political risk is that PIs may locate willing buyers
ready to purchase LPHD, only to find that FDA construes its privacy
policy in a way that prevents the sale from going forward. It is appro-
priate for FDA to deploy its funds to protect PIs against the latter
risk, but not the former one. Using FDA's available funds to compen-
sate investors for risks associated with a vigorous privacy protection
policy is a worthy expenditure of public funds. Using FDA's funds to
protect PICs from their own erroneous market projections is not.
Many of the political risks facing Sentinel System investors are
within FDA's control. FDA can reduce political risks by enunciating
clear privacy policies at the outset, so investors can accurately estimate
which sales they can and cannot make. FDA should not waste the
public's funds guaranteeing political risks that could have been elimi-
nated by fixing gaps and uncertainties in FDA's own privacy policy.
349
345 Klingebiel & Ruster, supra note 53, at 1 n.1.
346 See id.
347 See, e.g., Mateen Thobani, Private Infrastructure, Public Risk, FIN. & DEV., Mar.
1999, at 50, 53, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/
pdf/thobani.pdf ("Whether the potential benefits of private provision of infrastruc-
ture are fully realized depends on how governments allocate the risks.").
348 See id.
349 See Klingbiel & Ruster, supra note 53, at 4.
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FDA should focus its funds to address the residual risks that will
remain even after policy has been made as clear as it possibly can be.
Assume FDA adopts a policy that allows ancillary data sales for certain
categories of research that meet specified criteria. The residual risks
are that FDA's policy might change, or that FDA might construe its
existing policy in a novel way that rejects data uses that investors
believed would be permissible. FDA appropriately could provide risk
guarantees to protect investors from these latter, residual risks. How-
ever, it should not waste public funds insuring investors from risks
that could have been inferred from the agency's clearly stated policy.
Clearly-stated rules satisfy the public's need for transparency. They
also reduce the uncertainties investors face and will reduce FDA's
costs in attracting private capital. A clear privacy policy, backstopped
by appropriate risk guarantees, is key to getting the system financed
without jettisoning the protection of medical privacy.
CONCLUSION
In 1969, Richard Posner observed that industries providing essen-
tial infrastructure have always been, at the time their construction
began, at the frontiers of technological progress. 350 In authorizing
development of the Sentinel System infrastructure, Congress, for the
first time in seventy years, saw the need for a major new national infra-
structure and appointed a federal agency to oversee its development.
FDA is, in many respects, an accidental infrastructure regulator, thrust
into a new role that is strikingly different from its longstanding prod-
uct safety mandate. Fortunately, the challenges now facing the agency
are not new ones. In the United States, infrastructure needs have
"shifted from roads, sewers, and basic electrical grids to high-speed
data communication networks, but the development of infrastructure
continues to follow longstanding economic and political rules.
'3 51
Few strands of American law are as well developed, or as respected
internationally, as our long tradition of infrastructure regulation
which has, in a wide variety of industry contexts, harnessed private
capital to build new infrastructures to serve defined public interests
while still protecting vulnerable classes. Congress has framed Sentinel
System privacy as an infrastructure regulatory problem. Framing the
problem this way opens the door to solutions that draw on this rich
legal tradition. Decisions allowing use of Sentinel System data can
enjoy legitimacy and public acceptability, if decisions are made within
350 See Posner, supra note 34, at 549.
351 Chen, supra note 33, at 1620.
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a framework of appropriate institutional protections. The question
now is what, precisely, those protections ought to be.
